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I. INTRODUCTION: THE DOLDRUMS?
On behalf of The George Washington University Law School, let me be-
gin by expressing appreciation to the Comptroller General of the United
States, David M. Walker, and Paul Light, of the New York University and
the Brookings Institution, for participating in this colloquium. Rather than
dispel my initial pessimism, however, our discussion confirms my less-than-
optimistic prescription for the future of competitive sourcing. I fear that,
without drastic change, the Bush administration’s competitive sourcing ini-
tiative is doomed to fail.1 That may seem obvious to those who scrupulously
1. None of this is meant to suggest that there have not been successful outsourcing endeavors.
There have been plenty. Military history someday may recall that many key players in the suc-
cessful overthrow of Iraq weren’t wearing uniforms. While critics fretted that we sent too few
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follow the barrage of assaults—through legislative initiatives2 and litiga-
tion3—intended to derail the policy. But these pending roadblocks are mere
harbingers. Even if the Bush administration succeeds in implementing its
newly minted competitive sourcing policy, failure to achieve the policy’s as-
pirations appears imminent.4
soldiers to invade Iraq, experts knew that, on today’s battlefield, the number of soldiers doesn’t
tell the whole story. In Iraq, our military relied upon contractor personnel not only for trans-
portation, shelter, and food, but for unprecedented levels of battlefield and weaponry operation,
support, and maintenance. Accordingly, defense experts now recognize that, without contractors,
our military simply cannot project its awesome technical superiority abroad. But by no means
does this suggest that all of the legal issues associated with contractors on the battlefield have
been resolved. See, e.g., Keith Hartley, The Economics of Military Outsourcing, 11 Pub. Procure-
ment L. Rev. 287, 290 (2002) (acknowledging that using “civilians to replace military personnel
might have adverse impacts on the morale and ‘fighting spirit’ of the Armed Forces”); Michael
J. Davidson, Ruck Up: An Introduction to the Legal Issues Associated with Civilian Contractors on the
Battlefield, 29 Pub. Cont. L.J. 233 (2000); BrianH. Brady,Notice Provisions for United States Citizen
Contractor Employees Serving with the Armed Forces of the United States in the Field: Time to Reflect
Their Assimilated Status in Government Contracts? 147 Mil. L. Rev. 1 (1995). Brady was ahead of
his time in clearly articulating that “citizen contractor employees . . . in the field hold military
status. They are legitimate objects of attack and become prisoners of war when captured. . . .
They ought not be surprised about their status when they arrive in the field. . . . The time has
come to inform contractors about assimilation and make them part of the total force.” See also
Todd S. Millard, Overcoming Post-Colonial Myopia: A Call to Recognize and Regulate Private Military
Companies, 176 Mil. L. Rev. 1 (2003) (to be clear, “private military companies” (or PMAs) is the
current, politically correct term for “mercenaries”); The International Consortium of Inves-
tigative Journalists, Making a Killing: The Business of War (2003).
2. One of the most dramatic examples was the successful Van Hollen Amendment to H.R.
2989, the 2004 Transportation and Treasury Appropriation, which stated: “None of the funds
made available by this Act may be used to implement the revision to Office of Management and
Budget Circular A-76 made on May 29, 2003.” H. Amend. T.379(A026), 108th Cong. (2003),
available at http://thomas.loc.gov/; Christopher Lee, Competitive Sourcing Plan Hits Snag: House
Votes Against Rules That Would Speed Up Competition for Federal Jobs, Wash. Post., Sept. 11, 2003,
at A21. In late October, this matter went to conference after the Senate approved an amendment
by Senator George Voinovich, which imposed a different set of constraints upon the A-76 process.
Senate Votes to Allow Federal Workers to Protest A-76 Competitions in Funding Bill, 80 Fed. Cont.
Rep. 389 (Oct. 28, 2003). See also OMBUrged to Halt NIH Job Competitions, 45Gov’t Contractor
¶ 436 (Oct. 29, 2003) (raising concerns that “this aggressive approach to Circular A-76 is un-
dermining the advancement of science”). See also the Truthfulness, Responsibility, and Account-
ability in Contracting Act (TRAC), a bill introduced with 190 cosponsors, intended to limit
outsourcing until the costs and benefits were analyzed. Consistent with the discussion below, the
TRAC bill included findings that
(2) Federal agencies have been increasing reliance on service contracting even though there
are no reliable and comprehensive reporting systems . . . to determine whether service con-
tracting has achieved measurable cost savings or improved Government services for tax-
payers. . . . (4) Federal employees are being replaced by contractor employees without even
knowing . . . if the result is reduced costs or improved services. (5) Federal agencies do not
have systems in place to provide for work currently performed by Federal contractors to be
performed by Federal employees, even after a determination that in-house performance would
be more efficient and more cost effective.
H.R. 721, 107th Cong. § 2 (2001).
3. See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, National Treasury Employees
Union et al. v. Office of Management and Budget, No. 1:03CV01339 (D.D.C. filed June 19,
2003), available at http://www.govexec.com/pdfs/NTEU.pdf (requesting a judgment declaring
the revised circular illegal and directing use of the prior circular).
4. See, e.g., Competitive Sourcing: Implementation Will Be Challenging for Federal Agencies, Tes-
timony Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the
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Few agencies have the inclination (or resources) to commence any signifi-
cant number of competitions between civil servants and contractors under the
new rules. The competitions that do begin will take time,5 and aggressive time
limits may invalidate some of those. Accordingly, existing civil servants and
members of the armed services need not fear that hundreds of thousands of
contractor employees will replace them overnight. Nevertheless, the number
of government employees will continue to shrink, while the number of con-
tractor personnel serving the Government methodically increases. In addi-
tion, more than a decade of experience suggests that the rate of contractor
personnel growth will exceed the contraction within theGovernment’s ranks.6
Despite this cumulative expansion, as the government employee headcount
drops, the administration will declare victory. Herein lies the problem. The
current outsourcing initiative will achieve little more than a facially attractive
duping of the least sophisticated portion of the electorate. Legislators will
trumpet their contribution to the contraction of Big Government, and crowds
will dutifully applaud. Empirical research will continue to expose the hypoc-
risy of this policy,7 but the suffering will remain relatively quiet.
For a host of reasons, the competitive sourcing policy remains fatally
flawed. Most troubling is the Government’s unwillingness to appreciate the
policy’s costs. This leads to the corresponding failure to identify, obtain, and
invest appropriate resources needed to properly effectuate the policy. Quite
simply, the Government lacks sufficient qualified acquisition, contract man-
agement, and quality control personnel to handle the outsourcing burden.
This insufficiency includes two separate deficiencies: (1) the number of people
District of Columbia, Comm. on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, GAO-03–1022T (July 24, 2003)
(statement of David M. Walker), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d031022t.pdf.
Among other things, the Comptroller General expressed concerns that agencies set appropriate
goals rather than rely upon arbitrary quotas. Id. at 5. He also left no doubt that “[e]ffective human
capital practices will be key to successful implementation of competitive sourcing[.]” Id. at 8.
5. The revised Office of Management and Budget Circular No. A-76 [hereinafter OMB
Circular A-76], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a076/a76_incl_tech_
correction.pdf, at Attachment B, ¶ D.1., directs: “A standard competition shall not exceed 12
months from public announcement (start date) to performance decision (end date)” absent a
waiver, although a prospective six-month waiver could extend the period to eighteen months.
Whether these competitions span a year or many years (the norm under the predecessor A-76)
remains to be seen. See also The Notice of Revision to the Office of Management and Budget
Circular No. A-76, Performance of Commercial Activities, 68 Fed. Reg. 32134 (May 29, 2003)
[hereinafter Notice of Revision]. See generally David M. Walker, The Future of Competitive Sourc-
ing, 33 Pub. Cont. L.J. 299, 308 (2004) (noting that “aggressive timeframes might look good on
paper”).
6. A wealth of literature chronicles the accelerating privatization trend. See, e.g., infra notes
69–72.
7. In this regard, it is a pleasure to include not only Paul Light’s work, but also that of Dan
Guttman. See Daniel Guttman, Governance by Contract: Constitutional Visions; Time for Reflection
and Choice, 33 Pub. Cont. L.J. 321 (2004). Guttman was recently profiled for his longstanding
work in this area. “Along the way, he became convinced that theGovernment’s increasing reliance
on private companies raises basic, even constitutional, questions of accountability. He believes
that most agencies can no longer effectively oversee their contractors and that existing oversight
tools—such as setting performance standards in contracts—often don’t work.” Jason Pecken-
paugh, Shadow Boxer, 36:16 Gov. Exec. 41, 42 (2003).
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available and (2) the qualifications necessary for them to perform a compli-
cated, highly discretionary task over extended periods of time.8 This glaring
problem does not derive from the current vehicle for effectuating the policy:
the revised Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-76.9 But
these deficiencies will impede, if not derail, the policy’s implementation. Yet
the administration fails to acknowledge this need for resources. The silence
on this critical detail leads me to question whether the underlying policy is
deviously cynical or simply muddled and ill-conceived.
Here, the accompanying articles make a significant contribution. The
Comptroller General systematically demonstrates that a competitive sourcing
policy (although, arguably, not necessarily this competitive sourcing policy)
could be derived from accessible and defensible principles.10 His article log-
ically tracks the ten principles for a competitive sourcing regime agreed upon
by the Commercial Activities Panel.11 Among his numerous refreshing in-
sights, Paul Light reminds us that this policy has little to do with how many
people perform the Government’s missions and everything to do with who
those “public servants” will be. In other words, the true size of Government
cannot be measured by counting civil servants or soldiers. This reminder is
imperative if we are to rationally assess the success or failure of either a com-
petitive sourcing or an outsourcing policy.
Against that backdrop, and supplemented by thoughtful contributions from
public policy scholars Dan Guttman, John Forrer, and James Edwin Kee, this
introductory article predicts a bleak future for competitive sourcing. Let me
be clear. I do not doubt the administration’s fidelity with regard to competitive
sourcing. Rather, despite a dogged commitment to outsourcing, I fear that
the Government is ill-positioned to successfully outsource in a manner that
generates higher-quality services, lower prices, greater efficiency, or, ulti-
mately, better Government. Instead, I expect the competitive sourcing initia-
tive to further expose “long-standing problems in service contracting, includ-
ing poor planning, inadequately defined requirements, insufficient price
evaluation, and lax oversight of contractor performance.”12 Implementation
8. In addition to inadequacy of the acquisition workforce, discussed at length in Part III.B.
below, it seems clear that the cadre of existing government managers lack experience identifying,
selecting, tasking, and incentivizing a workforce as it transitions from government to contractor
employees.
9. OMB Circular A-76, supra note 5.
10. Moreover, in addition to his primary themes, his article highlights numerous important
points. For example, I agree that the ramifications of outsourcing are far too important to regulate
informally. Over time, it seems appropriate that OMB Circular A-76 should evolve into, or be
replaced by, a regulation (whether or not the Federal Acquisition Regulation, Title 48 of the
C.F.R.). See, e.g., Walker, supra note 5.
11. Commercial Activities Panel, Improving the Sourcing Decisions of the Govern-
ment: Final Report (2002) [hereinafter Commercial Activities Panel Report], available at
http://www.gao.gov/a76panel/dcap0201.pdf.
12. Contract Management: Trends and Challenges in Acquiring Services, Testimony Before the Sub-
comm. on Technology and Procurement Policy, Comm. on Government Reform, House of Represen-
tatives, GAO-01–753T, at 5 (May 22, 2001) (statement of David E. Cooper), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01753t.pdf.
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of the current policy will result in poorly structured contracting out. This
leads to disquieting expectations for the future nature of the Government.
The administration’s inclination to act first and plan later propels this article
to conclude that the competitive sourcing strategy is a recipe for disaster.13
In the end, this article illuminates an obvious, yet critical, problem. The
Government lacks sufficient qualified acquisition and contract management
professionals to administer its requirements. Continued outsourcing will ex-
acerbate this systemic weakness. As the Government increasingly relies upon
service contractors, the Government exposes itself and the public to greater
risks. But before addressing this daunting challenge, this article attempts to
explain how we came to this point. Specifically, it seeks to distinguish a prin-
cipled competitive sourcing policy from an ideological, antigovernment, out-
sourcing regime.
II. COMPETITIVE SOURCING OR OUTSOURCING?
Competitive sourcing involves determining, prospectively, whether gov-
ernment resources or the private sector offers the Government—as a con-
sumer—the best value in performing certain tasks.14 Outsourcing, on the
other hand, entails replacing existing government personnel with contractors
and relying upon the private sector when new tasks arise. Arguably, the pol-
icies achieve the same objective—replacing Government with contractor re-
sources—but competitive sourcing dramatically prolongs the transition.15
But most people don’t really care who supervises or pays the person who
determines their Social Security benefits, inspects their meat or produce, au-
dits their taxes, or controls their air traffic.16 The public simply wants their
13. “[D]ownsizing was not guided by strategic planning, nor has adequate consideration been
given to implementation challenges, such as the impact of the government’s reduction-in-force
rules. Overall, the government’s human resources policies and practices have not reflected, nor
been aligned with, current workforce dynamics and challenges, including demographics, profes-
sional development, mobility, and other issues.” Commercial Activities Panel Report, supra
note 11, at 28.
14. Our discussion is limited to privatization—to the extent it will occur—that takes the form
of contracting (or contracting out). Thus, for practical and legal reasons, we ignore the parallel
grant-making apparatus. In the larger context of privatization, grants and other unrelated vehicles
through which the Government delegates authority must be considered. See generally Daniel
Guttman & Barry Willner, The Shadow Government: The Government’s Multi-Billion-
Dollar Giveaway of Its Decision-Making Powers to Private Management Consultants,
“Experts,” and Think Tanks (1976).
15. In practice, competitive sourcing, however subtly, must eventually converge with out-
sourcing. In a competition, there are only two possible results: (1) the contractor can win and
replace the government organization or (2) the Government can win and maintain the status quo.
But the government workforce never gains ground. Because competitive sourcing policy peri-
odically (e.g., every five years) subjects the same tasks or requirements to competition, the con-
tractor ranks continue to swell.
16. True, after the September 11, 2001, tragedy, a surprising groundswell of support drove a
Herculean effort to replace private baggage screeners with government employees. While this
makes for great theater, it runs counter to the governmentwide trend. It also exposes the hypocrisy
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benefits (properly calculated) to arrive on time, their families to avoid illness,
to be free from harassment, and to enjoy a safe journey. Accordingly, the
competitive sourcing debate—determining who would most efficiently pro-
vide these services—often fails to resonate with most Americans.
Yet, for those who do care, the debate quickly polarizes participants into
two basic camps.17 One staunchly advocates the (rapidly changing) status quo:
that work currently being performed by government employees should re-
main in-house. This position idolizes, or at the very least respects, the ethos
of both public service and, more generally, public servants. The opposite camp
advocates outsourcing. The outsourcing proponents, whether favoring the
private sector or discounting the public service, assert that for-profit firms are
capable of performing much of the Government’s work. Further, they claim,
the private sector (if properly motivated) should outperform government em-
ployees (in terms of quality of service, price of service, or both).18 Neither of
these extreme positions, distilled into an abstract distinction between pro-
versus anti-government employees (or contractor employees), is uniquely
compelling.
Empirical evidence is scant to demonstrate that government employees are
more talented, committed, motivated, or honest than their private sector
counterparts, and vice versa. The two groups differ dramatically, however, in
at least one regard: their incentive structures.19 The private sector’s exposure
of the underlying policy. Outsourcing reflects the perception that the private sector will outper-
form government employees. Yet, in the aftermath of a startling and horrific crisis, the public
deluded itself into believing, for some inexplicable reason, that it would be safer if federal em-
ployees screened baggage. But we should not be surprised. Few legislators would consider it a
palatable option to suggest that, rather than mandating who will employ the screeners, a more
effective role for Government might be mandating sufficient pay for screeners to attract com-
petent personnel (and, of course, passing on those costs to the flying public).
17. Jody Freeman suggests an entirely different perspective, identifying various types of con-
cerns—consequentialist, technocratic, ethical, and administrative law—regarding contracting
out. Jody Freeman, The Contracting State, 28 Fla. St. L. Rev. 155, 169–76 (2000). Using Free-
man’s rubric, the lion’s share of my concerns are deemed either consequentialist or technocratic.
Freeman perceives that, for most, their “enthusiasm for contracting out . . . [is] motivated solely
by a concern about the results . . . rather than whether contracting out conforms to a set of a
priori principles of ‘moral’ action.” Id. at 169 (citations omitted). With regard to the technocratic
concerns, “[t]o some extent, objections to contracting out may be ameliorated by careful attention
to contract design. Contracts could specify tasks more clearly, detail procedures more thoroughly,
and clarify responsibilities. . . . For those functions that are easier to specify, agencies may be
nonetheless ill-equipped to monitor performance. . . .” Id. at 170–72. See alsoHarvey B. Feigen-
baum & Jeffrey R. Henig, The Political Underpinnings of Privatization: A Typology, 46 World Pol.
185 (1994). Feigenbaum and Henig’s typology is based upon three perspectives—administrative,
economic, and political—leading to three privatization strategies: pragmatic, tactical, and sys-
temic. From this they create an intriguing analytical tool correlatingmotivation and consequence.
18. A third faction, populated primarily by scholars and academics, eschews broad positions
and instead chooses sides based upon the nature of individual tasks, such as schools, prisons,
welfare, etc. See, e.g., infra note 71.
19. Few doubt that, without the type of external pressure exerted by the competitive sourcing
initiative, government managers face impenetrable hurdles in attempting to dramatically improve
efficiency or service. “Managers face an incentive structure that deters them from making
efficiency-enhancing changes. Managers tend to prefer current ways of doing business to vol-
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to market forces, and the related corporate purpose of pursuing profit, permits
(and, arguably, requires) a more diverse and potent arsenal of employee in-
centives and disincentives. These tools include compensation (salary, salary
increases, bonuses, stock incentives), opportunity for advancement, and, of
course, the risk of termination. While the Government can use similar tools,
their impact (or the degree to which these tools can influence behavior) is at
least perceived as far less dramatic, given a heavily constrained promotion and
bonus regime and an impenetrable de facto tenure system.The private sector–
government contrast is greatest at the extremes. The private sector offers far
greater economic rewards for success and threatens more credible sanctions
for less than desirable performance.20 While some still aspire to reform the
civil service system and inject more potent performance incentives,21 history
reminds us that this is a daunting task.22
This does not suggest that the Government is not staffed by many able,
highly motivated employees.23 Surely, public service attracts special people
untary cost-cutting activities. However, the A-76 process changes the manager’s choice set so
that the status quo is not an option.” Susan M. Gates & Albert A. Robbert, National Defense
Research Institute, RAND, Personnel Savings in Competitively Sourced DoD Activities:
Are They Real? Will They Last? xv (2000).
20. My experience suggests that government managers covet the private sector’s power to
more effectively reward excellence. Yet, comparatively, the more pressing perceived personnel
system inadequacy lies in the private sector’s ability to jettison underperforming personnel. This
makes sense. “[I]n outstanding organizations[,] . . . there is a progressive winnowing of talent. . . .
Microsoft tries to force out the lowest-performing 5% of its highly screened talent each year. Great
organizations are unabashed meritocracies; great organizations that fail are often those that forget
the importance of . . . selective weeding.” James Brian Quinn et al., Managing Professional Intellect:
Making the Most of the Best, Harv. Bus. Rev. 74 (1996) (emphasis added).
21. The Department of Defense continues to lead the initiative to eliminate the civil service
system. See, e.g., Shawn Zeller, Smashing the System, 35 Gov. Exec. 30 (2003) (discussing theDoD
initiative and the spearhead effort that resulted in the nascent Department of Homeland Security
creating its own personnel system). See also National Commission on the Public Service,
Urgent Business for America:Revitalizing the Federal Government for the 21st Century
(2003), available at http://www.brook.edu/gs/cps/volcker/urgentbusinessreport.htm(“Thefederal
workforce must be reshaped, and the system that supports it must be rooted in new personnel
management principles that ensure much higher levels of government performance.”). Pending
legislation may permit DoD to engage in a dramatic overhaul of the civil service system. See
generally Title XI, Civilian Personnel Matters, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2004, at http://thomas.loc.gov (search the bill text of the 108th Congress for H.R.
1588.ENR) (“the Secretary [of Defense] may, in regulations prescribed jointly with the Director
[of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM)], establish, and from time to time adjust, a
human resources management system. . . . The human resources management system established
. . . shall be referred to as the ‘National Security Personnel System.’. . . Any [such] system . . .
shall (1) be flexible [and] (2) be contemporary. . . .”).
22. “If the [National Performance Review] made some progress . . ., it proved far less suc-
cessful in transforming the government’s people policies through civil service reform.” Donald
F. Kettl, Center for Public Management, Brookings Institution, Reinventing Govern-
ment: A Fifth-Year Report Card, CPM 98–1, at 53 (1998), at http://www.brook.edu/
dybdocroot/gs/cpm/Government.pdf.
23. While I can offer no empirical evidence, my (albeit anecdotal) professional experiences in
Government, particularly my work at the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget (OMB), and the U.S. Army, convinced me that there are a wealth of talented,
motivated government personnel that rival any I have encountered in the private sector. At the
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and brings its own rewards. But contractors performing similar public service
tasks frequently experience the same unquantifiable, if not ephemeral, benefits
as government employees. Aside from characterizations of personnel, how-
ever, no shortage of economic and theoretical arguments favors outsourcing.
For example, Keith Hartley’s succinct introduction to the economics of out-
sourcing highlights the importance of competition, which “promotes inno-
vation, the application of new management techniques, the introduction of
new equipment and methods of working,” and flexibility.24 Graeme Hodge’s
thoughtful discussion of the theoretical foundations for privatization begins
by noting that economics drives most theories that favor privatization.25
Hodge introduces various schools of thought that tend to favor contraction
of government and, accordingly, outsourcing, including public choice the-
ory,26 agency theory,27 new public management,28 property rights theory,29
measurement issues (which we frequently refer to as “metrics”),30 and contin-
gency theory.31
Yet it’s surprisingly difficult to find a compelling statement of the objectives
for the new federal competitive sourcing policy. One of the clearest statements
opposite end of the spectrum, both in Government and in the private sector, I have observed,
and at times supervised, an unfortunate number of employees for whom the existing incentive
and disincentive structure—encompassing rules and norms—failed to motivate.
24. Hartley, supra note 1, at 289. He also mentions the “disciplines of the capital market and
the incentives and penalties of a fixed-price contract. . . .” Id.
25. Graeme A. Hodge, Privatization: An International Review of Performance 35
(1999).
26. “[F]unctions such as regulation, policy advice, and the delivery of services should be un-
dertaken separately. . . . [G]overnment organizations are often captured by those who tradition-
ally provide the services . . ., and that in the absence of a profit motive, bureaucrats . . . maximize
the size of their own bureau rather than maximizing benefits to customers or citizens. . . . .” Id.
at 36.
27. Building on a market model of organizations, agency theory assumes that the owners of
the company (here, the Government) are not the managers, and ownership and control are
separate. Therefore, “[t]his theory focuses on finding an optimal way of establishing andoperating
such contracts. . . .” Id. at 38–39.
28. “The central tenets of this new doctrine . . . emphasiz[e] management skills, quantified
performance targets, devolution, the separation of policy, commercial and noncommercial func-
tions, the use of private sector practices . . ., monetary incentives, and cost cutting. Importantly,
the new public management also emphasizes a preference for private ownership, and the use of
contracting out and contestability in the provision of public services.” Id. at 40.
29. This simple theory suggests that “private ownership of the assets of a company [or the
Government] results in superior profitability and effectiveness. . . . [T]he major focus is on in-
centives for performance improvement, principally at the level of the individual decisionmaker.”
Id. at 41–42.
30. While conceding that it is extraordinarily difficult to measure government performance,
“to the extent that the measurement of agency performance might become a more manageable
task, and to the extent that interpretation of performance might become clearer, privatization of
an agency may be seen as beneficial.” Id. at 43–44.
31. This theory postulates that “the role of the noneconomic objectives of privatization . . .
depends on the influence at any point in time of particular historical contingencies.” Id. at 44. It
recognizes “the plausible idea that privatization does not have an economic rationale at all.”
Replacing government employees with contractors may further political ends such as disempow-
ering unions or winning votes during elections. Id. at 35–36. “In other words, it is simply a tool
in the political kit bag available for use when deemed expedient.” Id. at 44.
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within the OMB Circular suggests: “The Administration’s general policy is
to rely on competition to select the providers of commercial activities. This
policy is supported by published reports and historical data demonstrating
that public-private competition generates significant cost savings, efficiency,
and innovation.”32 The first sentence expresses a deference to the competitiveness
of the private sector; the latter recognizes the value of salutary competition between
the public and private sectors. Nothing reconciles the two competing policy
statements.
The predecessor OMBCircular A-76more clearly stated the first principle:
“In the process of governing, theGovernment should not compete with its citizens.
The competitive enterprise system, characterized by individual freedom and
initiative, is the primary source of national economic strength.”33 After that
preface, the (classical outsourcing) policy statement concluded: “In recogni-
tion of this principle, it has been and continues to be the general policy of
the Government to rely on commercial sources to supply the products and
services the Government needs.”34 But this general language was diluted by
the more specific statement (favoring competitive sourcing) that it was the
Government’s policy to
Rely on the Commercial Sector. The Federal Government shall rely on commercially
available sources to provide commercial products and services. In accordance with
the provisions of this Circular and its Supplement, the Government shall not start
or carry on any activity to provide a commercial product or service if the product
or service can be procured more economically from a commercial source.35
This caveat, mandating an economic balancing, tempered, and somemight
say neutered, the outsourcing mandate. Now compare that language to the
watered-down articulation found in the revised circular: “The longstanding
policy of the federal government has been to rely on the private sector for
needed commercial services. To ensure that the American people receivemax-
imum value for their tax dollars, commercial activities should be subject to
the forces of competition.”36
At one level, little has changed. The articulated deference to the private
sector always implied that the policy has been outsourcing (but only when
savings were expected); but the current language states the private sector pref-
erence with less conviction. The revised OMB Circular A-76 more clearly
32. Notice of Revision, supra note 5, 68 Fed. Reg. 32,134, 32,135 (May 29, 2003). The Com-
mercial Activities Panel reaffirmed that “Competitions, including public-private competitions,
have been shown to produce significant cost savings for the government, regardless of whether
a public or a private entity is selected. Competition also may encourage innovation and is
key to continuously improving the quality of service delivery. . . . [F]ederal sourcing policies
should reflect the potential benefits of competition, including competition between and within
sectors . . .” Commercial Activities Panel Report, supra note 11, at 35.
33. OMB Circular A-76 (Aug. 4, 1983, Revised 1999) (emphasis added).
34. Id.
35. Id. (italics in original; bold added).
36. OMB Circular A-76, Notice of Revision, supra note 5.
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injects the concept of salutary competition.37 At another level, the policy sug-
gests the purest form of outsourcing. Use of contractors entails dependence
upon the marketplace, which, unlike the Government, is competitive. As dis-
cussed below, however, the battleground has shifted. The momentum to out-
source now appears to derive from the evolution in the test for what services
are deemed commercially available. The administration’s signals encourage
agencies to transition large numbers of positions from the Government to
contractors. And, in the end, actions speak louder than words.
A. Less Work Is “Inherently Governmental”
Given the scope of the revision, it is surprising that OMB Circular A-76
retains the longstanding distinction between inherently governmental functions
and commercial activities. If a function is inherently governmental, government
employees should perform it. But the converse is not true. The rule is not
simply that the private sector should perform all commercial activities. In-
stead, for commercial activities, the Government must determine whether to
keep the task in-house or deputize the private sector to perform the function.
That determination depends upon a cost comparison. In the end, therefore,
the decision to outsource hinges upon economic (rather than broader policy)
considerations, which all too often prove short term in nature.
Of course, the problem remains in determining exactly what functions are
inherently governmental.
Concern about which federal agency activities are inherently governmental func-
tions is not new. It goes back as far as the early days of the nation, as evidenced . . .
by the discussion in the Federalist Papers among the framers of the Constitution over
what functions are appropriate for the federal government to exercise.38
The “inherently governmental” versus “commercial” distinction today
proves neither adequate nor realistic. The longstanding policy entails two
steps. The Government first determines whether existing functions or tasks
are inherently governmental. If the function is deemed not inherently gov-
ernmental, the private sector competes against the Government (recast as
a hypothetical most efficient organization, or MEO). The best price (or,
preferably, best value) wins.
37. This interpretation assumes that the words “But now, in order” implicitly precede the
sentence beginning “To ensure. . . .” Granted, this may not be every reader’s plain meaning, but
it does seem to be a plausible interpretation. Obviously, ambiguities in regulatory drafting are
not unheard of, but they can wreak havoc on those tasked with policy implementation. See gen-
erally Steven L. Schooner, Review Essay: Communicating Governance: Will Plain English Drafting
Improve Regulation? 70 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 163, 178–80 (2002) (reviewing Thomas A. Murawski,
Writing Readable Regulations (1999)).
38. General Accounting Office, Government Contractors: Are Service Contractors
Performing Inherently Governmental Functions? Report to the Chairman, Federal Ser-
vice, Post Office and Civil Service Subcommittee, Committee on Governmental Affairs,
U.S. Senate, GAO/GGD-92–11, at 2 (1991), at http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat7/145453.
pdf. GAO conceded that “Because of the difficulty in defining governmental functions . . . , GAO
was not able to definitively conclude that these activities involved such functions.” Id.
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A deep chasm separates a putative government policy not to compete with
its citizens from a regime where the Government competes with its citizens
when monetary savings might result. While reasonable businesspeople may
disagree, both policies—not competing with the private sector and competing
with the private sector to maximize efficiency—have merit. Having said that,
the former policy represents a concrete principle potentially capable of sys-
tematic application.39 The latter policy—saving money—is more aspirational
and limitless. Because the cost savings are projected, they are neither guar-
anteed nor particularly reliable.
The administration’s stated policy pretends to have no dog in this fight,
projecting a bland neutrality, favoring neither side. The policy dispassionately
makes the lowest projected cost (or, hypothetically, the best potential value) the
measure of success. The approach is logical only within the rubric of a legal
fiction: neither side competes as they currently exist. For the purposes of the
competition, the Government organization recasts itself as a hypothetical
MEO. Similarly, the contractor’s proposal reflects no more than the contrac-
tor’s current perception of how, and with whom, it would approach and per-
form the specified task. This scheme never satisfied me. It seems disingenuous
that the Government should compete on the assumption that, going forward,
it will exercise optimal managerial skills, engage purely in results-oriented
behavior, retain its highest-producing employees, routinely jettison its least-
productive personnel, and, in a nutshell, outperform the status quo. It begs
the question: if the Government could manage a task in such a manner, why
39. Individuals interested in other, less obvious, competitive tensions between the Govern-
ment and the private sector need only look toward the Government’s evolving use of information
technology in the marketplace. See, e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz et al., Computer & Communica-
tions Industry of America (CCIA), The Role of Government in a Digital Age (2000), at
http://www.ccianet.org/govt_comp.php3. CCIA organizes its twelve principles for online and
informational government activity using a traffic-light scheme. The green light principles, or
areas where the Government’s participation is welcome, include (1) providing public data and
information; (2) improving the efficiency with which governmental services are provided; and
(3) supporting basic research. The yellow light principles suggest that the Government should
(4) exercise caution in adding specialized value to public data and information; (5) only provide
private goods, even if private-sector firms are not providing them, under limited circumstances;
(6) only provide a service online if private provision with regulation or appropriate taxationwould
not be more efficient; (7) ensure that mechanisms exist to protect privacy, security, and consumer
protection online; (8) promote network externalities only with great deliberation and care; and
(9) be allowed to maintain proprietary information or exercise rights under patents and/or copy-
rights only under special conditions (including national security). The red light principles assert
that the Government should (10) exercise substantial caution in entering markets in which
private-sector firms are active; (11) generally not aim to maximize net revenues or take actions
that would reduce competition; and (12) only be allowed to provide goods or services for which
appropriate privacy and conflict-of-interest protections have been erected. Applying its princi-
ples, for example, CCIA is particularly concerned with the Postal Service’s bill-paying market
(see USPS Payment Services, at http://www.usps.com/paymentservices/welcome.htm). To appre-
ciate CCIA’s position, one need only ask what public policy is served by the Postal Services’
seemingly direct competition with private endeavors such as PayPal, at https://www.paypal.com/;
Western Union, at http://www.westernunion.com/index_consumer.asp; orEcash/Authorize.Net,
at http://www.infospaceinc.com/payment/. This is a particularly compelling example because, in
almost every service it performs, the Postal Service competes with the private sector for revenue.
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has it not done so previously? Moreover, shouldn’t the Government’s failure
to previously have achieved these efficiencies dramatically prejudice its stand-
ing in competing for future work?40 I would prefer a similar, but significantly
different, two-step process. The potential for short-term cost savings would
play no role.41 Similar to the current regime, the Government would deter-
mine whether an existing function was inherently governmental. The Gov-
ernment would retain inherently governmental functions. The private sector
would perform all other functions (which, by definition, would be deemed
commercial). Of course, the private sector would experience periodic, routine
competition consistent with the federal procurement system’s dictates.42 Over
time, the best-qualified firms, offering the most-favorable prices and best ser-
vice, would perform the lion’s share of these services. But nothing suggests
that momentum is building for such a simple approach.
What is particularly intriguing about the dilution of the policy statement
in the revised circular—the watering down of deference to the private sec-
tor—is the apparent disconnect between stated aspiration and expected out-
come. The predecessor circular contained a strong policy statement, but
proved weak in implementation. The current circular, perceived as a stronger
vehicle for outsourcing, hides behind a gentler policy statement.
How did the policy become so muddled? The answer lies in aspirations or
metrics. As suggested above, competitive sourcing proponents could offer any
number of measures to demonstrate the success of such a policy.43 The most
common metrics include cost savings,44 superior quality of services rendered,
40. To the extent that the Government increasingly relies upon past performance information
to evaluate contractors, it seems silly to ignore the Government’s past performance when the
government organization is competing directly against the private sector. For a well-researched
discussion of the evolution of past performance evaluation, see generally Nathaniel Causey, Past
Performance Information, De Facto Debarments, and Due Process: Debunking the Myth of Pandora’s
Box, 29 Pub. Cont. L.J. 637, 645–59 (2000). For a discussion of the theoretical underpinnings
of the initiative, see, e.g., Steven Kelman, Procurement and Public Management: The Fear
of Discretion and the Quality of Government Performance 38–47, 63–69 (1990).
41. This is consistent with my skepticism regarding those who become carried away with the
concept of businesslike government. Steven L. Schooner, Fear of Oversight: The Fundamental
Failure of Businesslike Government, 50 Am. U. L. Rev. 627 (2001).
42. As David Walker’s article suggests, such an approach—in the long term—seems more
consistent with reality. Except in an instance of market failure, if the Government is continuously
subjected to competition with the private sector, eventually the private sector should be expected
to prevail. Once the function migrates to the private sector, it seems unlikely that theGovernment
will subsequently displace the private sector. Walker, supra note 5; see also supra note 15.
43. See, e.g., Hartley, supra note 1; Hodge, supra note 25.
44. See, e.g., Gates & Robbert, supra note 19, at xiv (“projected personnel cost savings are
substantial in both in-house and contractor wins, ranging from 30 to 60 percent”). For a dis-
senting perspective, see Max B. Sawicky, Show Me the Money: Evidence Is Sorely Lacking That the
Bush Administration’s Proposed A-76 Rules for Contracting Will Bring Budget Savings, Economic
Policy Institute Briefing Paper No. 145, at http://epinet.org/content.cfm/briefingpapers_bp145.
Sawicky asserts that, among other things, (1) the costs savings do not necessarily derive from
examples that are representative of the types of work that may be contracted in the future; (2) the
case studies were cherry-picked and, accordingly, provide better results than a random survey
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and improved customer satisfaction.45 That might explain why “President
Bush [was] a major advocate of . . . hiring private firms to do the government’s
work—and implemented this policy in Texas while he was governor there.”46
Yet despite its underpinnings, the current outsourcing policy focused upon
a more-direct, easier-to-measure, yet far-less-meaningful benchmark: the
number of government employees. The Bush administration today favors out-
sourcing47 because, like its Democratic predecessor, it wants to tout the elim-
ination of government employees.48 Until the political pressure became un-
would reveal; and (3) the cost savings fail to recognize costs “shifted to other federal agencies or
the taxpayer.” Moreover, the DoD Inspector General suggested that the pressure to outsource
results in increased costs.
DoD acquisition organizations stated that reductions in in-house . . . support personnel re-
quired the[m] to contract for additional services, such as engineering and logistical analysis,
that the Government once would have provided. As a result, technical support costs increased
because . . . obtaining contract support was more expensive than obtaining in-house . . . sup-
port. . . . [C]ontract labor rates are significantly higher [$20,000 to $180,000] per staff year
than rates . . . charged for the same service performed by Government employees.
Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense, DoD AcquisitionWorkforceReduction
Trends and Impacts, Report No. D-2000–088, at 18 (2000) [hereinafter DoD AcquisitionWork-
force Report]. See also Hartley, supra note 1, at 290. Hartley suggests that transaction costs are
“[a] central feature of outsourcing and the economics of contracting” and that “the transaction
cost analysis shows that the costs of managing contracts, including arranging bids, monitoring
outcomes and taking legal action for contract failures, may offset any efficiency savings. . . .”
45. Jacques Gansler asserts that data exist to disprove many of the arguments against com-
petitive sourcing. Specifically, advocates assert that competitive sourcing may lead to (1) better
performance; (2) lower costs; (3) savings over time; (4) increased competition opportunities for
small business; (5) fewer government layoffs than anticipated and more government control over
employees; and (6) a competitive rather than a monopolistic environment. See, e.g., Jacques S.
Gansler, Six Myths of Competitive Sourcing, 35:8 Gov. Exec. 85–86 (2003).
46. Dru Stevenson, Privatization of Welfare Services: Delegation by Commercial Contract, 45Ariz.
L. Rev. 83 (2003), citing David J. Kennedy, Due Process in a Privatized Welfare System, 64 Brook.
L. Rev. 231, 232 (1998), for the proposition that “Governor Bush’s effort to privatize most of
Texas’ welfare system, in turn, seemed rooted in his attempt to make a name for himself with
the kind of bold experimentation that could carry him to national office.” Id. at 83 n.2. See also
Matthew Diller, Form and Substance in the Privatization of Property Programs, 49 UCLA L. Rev.
1739, 1763 n.94 (2002) (“Governor Bush sought to hand the administration of the state’s welfare
system over to the Lockheed Martin Corporation and Electronic Data Systems Corporation.”
Further, “[d]uring his tenure as governor of Texas, President Bush also sought to involve faith-
based institutions in the delivery of government-funded social services. . . .”).
47. Competitive sourcing is one of five governmentwide initiatives in the Bush management
agenda. See, e.g., Office of Management and Budget, The President’s Management Agenda,
Fiscal Year 2002, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2002/mgmt.pdf.
48. Nor would it be fair or correct to suggest that this represents a dramatic break from prior
administrations or that this was not a bipartisan desire. For decades:
[P]ersonnel ceilings were accompanied by bipartisan silence on the changing nature of the
federal workforce. . . . Government budget documents, organization charts, and phone books
captured the full dimensions of the official workforce, but gave no hint of the dimensions of
the private workforce. . . .
In this setting, a new generation of reformers—the Privatizers, Downsizers, and Reinventers
of the 1980s and 1990s—came to argue for reform of Big Government with little evident
knowledge of the history or legacy of past reforms. When, in 1993, the Clinton administration
announced its intent to “reinvent government,” the focal point of the announcement was a
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bearable, the administration repeatedly offered eye-catching quotas for the
number of employees to be cut.49 Although these quotas are now unofficial
and internal,50 they remain the primary purpose of the policy.51 Such a policy
exhibits a shocking level of cynicism. But the cynicism is fueled by a suffi-
ciently gullible public. Herein lies the attraction of embracing the small gov-
ernment myth.52
B. The Shrinking Government Myth
The Bush administration’s interest in competitive sourcing lies in shrinking
the number of federal employees. That’s good politics, because the bipartisan
commitment to reduce Big Government—by reducing the number of federal employees.
Fittingly, just before the century’s end, it was the Brookings Institution that reported the
discovery that the official federal workforce was only a fraction of the size of the “shadow of
government. . . .”
Daniel Guttman, Public Purpose and Private Service, The Twentieth Century Culture of Contracting
Out and the Evolving Law of Diffused Sovereignty, 52 Admin. L. Rev. 859, 890 (2000); see also Vice
President Al Gore, The Best Kept Secrets in Government: A Report to President Bill
Clinton 1, 207 (GPO 1996) (the executive branch, excluding the independent Postal Service,
has “the smallest workforce in 30 years”).
49. See, e.g., Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2004 (2003), at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2004/budget.html under the link to Budget andMan-
agement Highlights (Defense Department and Department of Veterans Affairs plan to outsource
55,000 civilian positions in 2003); Christopher Lee, Army Outsourcing Plan Decried, Wash. Post,
Dec. 21, 2002, at A4 (suggesting that the plan could affect more than one of every six Army jobs).
50. See, e.g., Christopher Lee, OMB to Drop Quotas for Outsourcing of Jobs, Wash. Post., July
25, 2003, at A23 (noting that skeptics “said OMB officials could still impose de facto quotas by
refusing to bless agency plans that do not meet the old goals”).
51. See, e.g., Office of Management and Budget, Competitive Sourcing: Reasoned and
Responsible Public-Private Competition: Agency Activities: A Supplement to the July
2003 Report (Sept. 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/procurement/comp_
sourc_addendum.pdf. Attachment A, Table 1, details the “OMB Estimates of Commercial Activ-
ities at Agencies Tracked under the PMA.” For each agency, the table indicates the total work-
force, the number of full-time-equivalents (FTEs) performing commercial activities, the total
number of those FTEs available for competition, and the percentage of the total workforce that
this number represents. If the numbers are not quotas, why would OMB be tracking them pur-
suant to the President’s Management Agenda? See also Attachment B, Competitive Sourcing:
New Scorecard Criteria, detailing how agencies earn “yellow” or “green” status, both of which
we must assume are better than “red” status. The numbers are startling, particularly given the
agencies with the greatest percentage of their workforce available for competition: the Small
Business Administration (69 percent); the Department of Education (62 percent); the ArmyCorps
of Engineers (59 percent); Housing and Urban Development (39 percent); the Department of
Defense (45 percent—more than 270,000 employees); the General Services Administration (37
percent); the Department of Agriculture (36 percent); the Department of Interior (33 percent);
and the Department of Energy (31 percent). Compare these agencies to those with the lowest
percentage: the Smithsonian Institution (0 percent); the Environmental Protection Agency
(2 percent); the Department of Justice (3 percent); the Social Security Administration (6 percent);
and the Department of State (10 percent). Of these, I find the Justice Department figure the
least credible. Even given a large number of prosecutorial and policy positions, I have no doubt
that the private sector could effectively perform more than 3 percent of the work performed by
the agency’s attorneys, paralegals, and support staff.
52. As discussed above, Hodge likely would embrace this within his contingency theory.
Hodge, supra notes 25 & 31.
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tale of a shrinking Federal Government, despite its dubious veracity, offers
broad-ranging appeal.53 Some, but not all, of the best tall tales begin with a
grain of truth. Enduring fiction involving the Loch Ness monster54 and Big-
foot (Sasquatch)55 is often widely believed, despite contradictory empirical
53. Arguably, this could be seen as a classic public choice anecdote. No rational contemporary
legislator would risk campaigning based upon promises to hire more government employees.
There are exceptions. Candidates seeking to appear tough on crime promise to put more police
on the street (although they rarely focus upon the tax increase or corresponding service decrease
that will be required to achieve such an end). In an environment of cascading budget deficits, it
is similarly risky to even acknowledge that policies, however well received by the public, bear
actual costs. Public choice helps us accept why we cannot expect legislation to reflect rational,
responsible decision making.
[M]odern textualists . . . argue that individual legislators’ preferences cannot realistically be
aggregated into a coherent collective decision, and that legislative outcomes often turn on
procedural idiosyncrasies that make the legislature’s final choice . . . arbitrary. Building on
Condorcet’s paradox, modern social choice theory suggests that, while individual policy pref-
erences are transitive (if I prefer A to B and B to C, then I prefer A to C), a multimember
body’s preferences may be intransitive (the legislature as a whole may prefer A to B to C to
A) . . . [and] the intransitivity of the legislature’s preferences can lead to an endless cycle of
legislative outcomes. The procedures for considering legislation thus play a crucial role in
determining its content. . . .
[S]ocial choice theory predicts that . . . legislative outcomes will largely depend on the sequence
in which alternatives are presented, so that those who control the legislative agenda will . . .
influence . . . the legislation’s final shape. Hence, the final outcome may represent only one of
many possible majority outcomes. . . . [S]trategic voting (including logrolling across different
substantive areas) may also decisively affect a given proposal’s success.
John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 2387, 2412–13 (2003). See also Saul
Levmore, From Cynicism to Positive Theory in Public Choice, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 375 (2002) (“It
offers incoherent majorities, aggregation impossibilities, and most famously—though perhaps
unfortunately—self-serving, overachieving interest groups that are busy imposing external costs
on less-organized citizens and generating rent-seeking costs in many subtle ways.”); David B.
Spence, A Public Choice Progressivism, Continued, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 397, 398 n.2 (2002) (using
“the term ‘public choice’ . . . to refer to the analytical approach of neoclassical economics—one
characterized by a focus on the maximizing behavior of rational individuals”); Bob Rouder,Note,
Mediating the Professional Paradox: An Application of the Aggregate Idiot Phenomenon, 80 Tex. L.
Rev. 671, 699 (2002) (“[T]he ethos of all social choice studies is to understand the process of
preference aggregation—how groups reach a single outcome from varied inputs.”); Symposium,
Public Oversight of Public/Private Partnerships, 28 Fordham Urban L.J. 1357, 1359 (2001) ( Jack
Beerman observes that “Public choice analysis would assume that [government officials] will
privatize only when it is in their interest to do so, i.e., when the gains to government officials
. . . (in terms of political support . . .) outweigh any losses. . . .”); Cheryl D. Block, Truth and
Probability—Ironies in the Evolution of Social Choice Theory, 76 Wash. U. L.Q. 975 (1998); Maxwell
L. Stearns, The Misguided Renaissance of Social Choice, 103 Yale L.J. 1219 (1994).
54. See, e.g., The Legend of Nessie, at http://www.nessie.co.uk/ (detailing staggering numbers
of sightings, film evidence, sonar contacts, and, of course, stories); The Beast of Loch Ness, at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/lochness/ (with information from the 1999 Public Broadcasting
Service broadcast following the scientific sonar survey of the Loch).
55. See, e.g., BFRO, The Bigfoot Field Researchers Organization, at http://www.bfro.net/
(“The only scientific organization probing the bigfoot/Sasquatch mystery,” noting that “On Fri-
day, September 27, 2002, during National Public Radio’s (NPR) Talk of the Nation: Science Friday
with Ira Flatow, Dr. Jane Goodall made a striking comment on her strong beliefs that large
“undiscovered” primates, such as the Yeti or Sasquatch, do indeed exist.”); Bigfoot: Fact or Fan-
tasy, at http://www.rfthomas.clara.net/bigfoot.html.
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evidence.56 (Granted, recent discoveries appear to confirm the existence of
the giant squid, so caution may be appropriate in discussing these weighty
issues.57)
But our Government is not shrinking. Surely, in our lifetimes, the nature
of Government changed dramatically. Government employment rolls indicate
that we are governed by the smallest civil service, and protected by the leanest
military, in decades. But do not be deceived. Behind the “lies, damned lies,
and statistics”58 lies a growing, not shrinking, behemoth. But the growth of
Government has been largely masked by cutting government employment
rather than programs.59 Outside of the public conscience, contractors have
filled the gap, and the Government has grown. This is why Paul Light’s
empirical work is so important.60
Our elected leaders know that the public accepts the small government
myth and ignores the details. There are two strands to the small government
story. One, the less frequently told, encompasses actual reductions in the size
(and typically the scope) of Government. Before turning to the second out-
sourcing strand, replacing existing government personnel with contractorper-
sonnel, let me offer a single small-government anecdote that, in my opinion,
highlights the hypocrisy of the jingoistic small government mantra.
C. A Disquieting Detour
Examples abound to illustrate the hypocrisy and costs of perpetuating the
small government myth. Consider the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The
president and Congress long have known of the public’s enmity toward the
instrumentality responsible for collecting the nation’s taxes.61 This sentiment
56. Truth apparently spreads slower than fiction. See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions, Nat’l
Geographic Magazine, at http://www.nationalgeographic.com/ngm/faq.html.
Q:When will you again publish the works of Robert Kincaid—the photographer inTheBridges
of Madison County?
A: Alas, the sexy, middle-aged photographer, portrayed by Clint Eastwood in the film that
followed the book, is pure fiction. There is not, and never was, a Robert Kincaid here, although
some of our photographers have shamelessly encouraged the comparison.
57. See, e.g., Giant Squid Washes Up on Beach, CNN, July 22, 2002, at http://www.cnn.
com/2002/TECH/science/07/22/australia.squid/; the Smithsonian Institution’s Search for the
Giant Squid, at http://partners.si.edu/squid/; Chasing Giants, On the Tail of the Giant Squid, Dis-
covery Channel, at http://dsc.discovery.com/convergence/giantsquid/giantsquid.html; Giant
Squid (Architeuthis clarkei), at http://ncca.bournemouth.ac.uk/main/staff/vassili/giant_squid.html.
58. Mark Twain, Autobiography (1924) (attributing the quote to Benjamin Disraeli).
59. Paul C. Light, The Public Service, 31 Gov. Exec. 14 ( June 1999).
60. Paul C. Light, Fact Sheet on the True Size of Government (2003), at http://www.brook.
edu/gs/cps/light20030905.htm; see also Paul C. Light, An Update on the Bush Administration’s
Competitive Sourcing Initiative (2003), at http://www.brook.edu/dybdocroot/views/testimony/
light/20030724.pdf.
61. Too few Americans consciously embrace the inscription above the entrance to the IRS
headquarters building: “Taxes are what we pay for a civilized society—Oliver Wendell Holmes.”
Frankly, “[t]axpayers will never like its functions, love its employees, or find the same level of
satisfaction they seek in their banking services.” Donald F. Kettl, Taxing Reform: Assessing the Plans
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is deep and widespread. Yet, during the 1990s, our elected representatives
deferred to the public’s preference for a smaller Internal Revenue Service, or,
at very least, a “kinder, gentler” IRS. Even when contrasted with the general
downsizing of Government, the IRS suffered swift, dramatic personnel cuts.
Despite the public applause, these reductions are deeply troubling. Not
surprisingly, the personnel reductions appear to correlate with a reduction in
the rate at which the IRS audits individual tax returns. The following chart,
which correlates recent IRS workforce reductions with taxpayer audit rates,
paints a stark picture.
In 1999, individuals were half as likely to be audited when compared to
1997.64 But these data—chosen to correlate with available personnel infor-
mation—actually mask the severity of the decrease. When the 1999 data are
compared to the experience over the preceding twenty years, the drop in audit
rate appears even more dramatic.65 It appears, then, that the desire for small
to Transform the IRS, Brookings Institution Policy Brief No. 22 (1997), at http://www.brook.
edu/dybdocroot/comm/policybriefs/pb022/pb22.htm.
62. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Federal Civilian Workforce Statistics:
Occupations of Federal White-Collar and Blue-Collar Workers as of September 30,
1997, OMSOE-OWI-56–25, at Table W-A2, Full-Time Civilian White Collar Employment by
Occupation (1998), at http://www.opm.gov/feddata/ocwcbc97.pdf.
63. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Federal Civilian Workforce Statistics:
Occupations of Federal White-Collar and Blue-Collar Workers as of September 30,
1999, OMSOE-OWI-56–26, at Table W-A2, Full-Time Civilian White Collar Employment by
Occupation (2000), at http://www.opm.gov/feddata/ocwcbc99.pdf.
64. Data derive from the 1997 and 1999 IRS Data Books, available at http://www.irs.gov/
taxstats/article/0,,id102174,00.html.
65. For the period 1980–2000, the average examination rate was 1.13. If the post-1997 data
are excluded, however, the rate rises to 1.21. In other words, the 1999 rate represents only 41
percent of the average rate for the period 1980–1997. These data derive from IRS Data Books
for 1993 through 2001, and IRS Annual Reports for 1982 through 1992.
Tax-Related Reductions in Personnel and Examination Rates
Employee Classification 199762 199963 Decrease:1997–1999
0512—Internal Revenue Agent
(average grade: GS-12) 14,609 13,276 9%
0526—Tax Technician
(average grade: GS-9) 3,756 3,224 14%
0592—Tax Examining
(average grade: GS-7) 19,453 13,643 30%
Total 39,815 32,142 19%
Examination rate of
individual returns by year 1 (0.99) 0.50 50%
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Government can, at least in this one case, overcome an almost tautological
knowledge that an inadequate collection regime must mean that honest tax-
payers bear any increased tax burden caused by tax cheaters (and, of course,
those that make honest mistakes in their own favor).66
At the risk of becoming distracted by this anecdote, this snapshot merits
further examination because it presents another troubling, yet classic down-
sizing experience. It appears that, faced with a budget-based mandate to re-
duce personnel, the seniority system protected the more senior personnel,
while the IRS jettisoned its junior employees.67 In other words, the personnel
reduction rate increased as the seniority level decreased. Arguably, the result
of this inverse relationship is that what remains all too often is (1) a top-heavy
workforce with a disproportionate number of managers for the remaining
workers; (2) too few workers to perform the necessary, but potentially less-
interesting, high-volume work; and (3) a significant decrease in workforce
energy. While this limited snapshot cannot confirm this theory, it potentially
goes a long way toward explaining how a cumulative workforce cut of less
than 20 percent could reduce the audit rate by 50 percent.68
66. Ultimately, at some level we must recognize that the antitax sentiment is so strong that
consequences are either irrelevant or counterintuitive. See, e.g., Paul Krugman, The Tax-Cut Con,
N.Y. Times Magazine, Sept. 14, 2003, at 54 (discussing the rationale underlying the naive, but
seemingly popular, antitax crusade in the United States).
One of those doctrines has become famous under the name “supply-side economics.” It’s the
view that the government can cut taxes without severe cuts in public spending. The other
doctrine is often referred to as “starving the beast,” a phrase coined byDavid Stockman,Ronald
Reagan’s budget director. It’s the view that taxes should be cut precisely in order to force severe
cuts in public spending. Supply-side economics is the friendly, attractive face of the tax-cut
movement. But starve-the-beast is where the power lies.
. . .
For the looming fiscal crisis doesn’t represent a defeat for the leaders of the tax-cut crusade
or a miscalculation on their part. Some supporters of President Bush may have really believed
that his tax cuts were consistent with his promises to protect Social Security and expandMedi-
care; some people may still believe that the wondrous supply-side effects of tax cuts will make
the budget deficit disappear. But for starve-the-beast tax-cutters, the coming crunch is exactly
what they had in mind.
See also America’s Deficits: A Flood of Red Ink, Economist, Nov. 6, 2003, available at http://
www.economist.com/world/na/displayStory.cfm?story_id2189237 (“Mr. Bush has two basic
fiscal goals. . . . The first is to starve government of money to force it to tackle entitlement
reform. . . .”).
67. An interesting gender observation also might be made here. The IRS reductions affected
women more heavily than men. Internal revenue agents are primarily (60 percent) male, while
tax examiners and tax technicians are predominantly (79 percent and 69 percent respectively)
female. See supra notes 62 & 63. If these percentages were the same in 1997 and 1999, then
female employees accounted for more than 70 percent of the personnel reduction.
68. Of course, I do not ignore the possibility that the plummeting audit rate reflects an evo-
lution toward more sophisticated and effective audit mechanisms that, for example, derive from
innovative use of information technology to provide meaningful oversight for the burgeoning
volume of electronic filings. I am heartened by work such as that by John Braithwaite,Meta Risk
Management and Responsive Regulation for Tax System Integrity, 25 Law & Pol’y 1 (2003) (“A further
step toward a reflexive risk paradigm is for a tax office to monitor and seek to remake the risk
management systems of the organizations it regulates.” Id. at 2.). Yet, while I concede that this
lies outside my area of expertise, my more knowledgeable colleagues caution me not to expect
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III. OUTSOURCING’S DIM PROSPECT
Returning to the other, more relevant strand of the small government
myth, the outsourcing trend increases the number of nongovernmental per-
sonnel performing tasks previously performed by civil servants and military
personnel. But that does not mean that there are not other, valid reasons for
the trend. No shortage of literature focuses upon the outsourcing phenom-
enon, particularly from a public policy perspective.69 The last few years have
seen increased examination of the topic in legal scholarship, with numerous
journals publishing symposia grappling with a host of related issues.70 This
and other scholarship contemplate some of the thorny issues implicated when
Governments, at the federal, state, and local levels, rely on the private sector.71
too much in light of the current, all-too-often-outdated IRS information technology and man-
agement resources.
69. See, e.g., Phillip J. Cooper, Governing by Contract: Challenges and Opportunities
for Public Managers (2003); Mark A. Abramson & Ronald S. Harris III, The Procurement
Revolution (2003) (particularly chapters 1, 3, and 5–7); John D. Donahue & Joseph S. Nye Jr.,
Market Based Governance: Supply Side, Demand Side, Upside, and Downside (2002); El-
liott D. Sclar, You Don’t Always Get What You Pay For: The Economics of Privatization
(2000); Donald F. Kettl, Sharing Power: Public Governance and Private Markets (1993);
John D. Donahue, The Privatization Decision: Public Ends, Private Means (1989); Gutt-
man & Willner, supra note 14.
70. See, e.g., Symposium, Public Values in an Era of Privatization, 116Harv. L. Rev. 1211 (2003);
Symposium, New Forms of Governance: Ceding Power to Private Actors, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 1687
(2002); Single Subject Issue, Privatization and Outsourcing, 30 Pub. Cont. L.J. 551 (2001); Sym-
posium, Accountability and Democracy in the Era of Privatization, 28 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1319
(2001); Annual Regulation of Business Focus, Privatization, 52 Admin. L. Rev. 813 (2000); Proj-
ect, Privatization: The Global Scale-Back of Government Involvement in National Economies, 48 Ad-
min. L. Rev. 435 (1996); Symposium, Comparative Models of Privatization: Paradigms and Politics,
21 Brook. J. Int’l L. 1 (1995).
71. See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1367, 1371
(2003) (“contend[ing] that constitutional law’s current approach to privatization is fundamentally
inadequate in an era of increasingly privatized government.”); Stevenson, supra note 46, at 130
(“in the debate about which government services are best-suited for private enterprise, . . . welfare
services should be . . . last in line. The policy goals are simply too complex and, in a democratic
society, conflicted.”); Janna J. Hansen, Note, Limits of Competition: Accountability in Government
Contracting, 112 Yale L.J. 1465 (2003) (New York City child welfare services); Lewis D. Solomon,
Edison Schools and the Privatization of K-12 Public Education: A Legal and Policy Analysis, 30 Fordham
Urb. L.J. 1281, 1340 (2003) (“As public schools continue to fail . . ., privatization may . . . offer
hope for inner-city youth. The system can change through the . . . market forces coupled with
rigorous, contractual standards of accountability and greater parental involvement.”); Stacie A.
Remy Vest,Military Housing Privatization Initiative: A Guidance Document for Wading Through the
Legal Morass, 53 A.F. L. Rev. 1 (2002); Jeffrey A. Renshaw, Utility Privatization in the Military
Services: Issues, Problems, and Potential Solutions, 53 A.F. L. Rev. 55 (2002); Regina T. Jefferson,
Privatization: Not the Answer for Social Security Reform, 58 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1287 (2001);
Mathew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules, Discretion, and Entrepreneurial
Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1121 (2000); Cheryl L.Wade, For-Profit Corporations That Perform
Public Functions: Politics, Profit, and Poverty, 51 Rutgers L. Rev. 323, 324 (1999) (“When . . .
companies manage prisons, public schools, and hospitals, and distribute welfare benefits, the
inmates, students, patients, and welfare recipients they purport to serve become human com-
modities. . . .”); Vivian Mangold, Protection, Privatization, and Profit in the Foster Care System, 60
Ohio. St. L.J. 1295 (1999); Florecio Lopez de Silanes et al., Privatization in the United States, 28
Rand J. Econ. 447 (1997); Oliver Hart et al., The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an
Application to Prisons, Q. J. Econ. 1127 (1997).
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A wealth of comparative scholarship examines lessons learned and experiences
outside the United States.72
A. A Federal Workforce Metamorphosis?73
At the federal level, what troubles me most is neither the stated nor the
unstated policy. Rather, my chief concern is that, in its rush to outsource, the
administration remains oblivious to the most fundamental realities of imple-
menting its new policy. When the policy gets stripped away, one insurmount-
able obstacle remains. The macro (governmentwide) and micro (acquisition
workforce) effects of the 1990s downsizing frenzy left the Federal Govern-
ment woefully unprepared to identify, recruit, and manage the revolutionized
workforce that the competitive sourcing initiative envisions.74 That the com-
petitive sourcing initiative exacerbates a previously existing human capital cri-
72. See, e.g., Alessandro Ancarani, The Impact of Public Firms Commercialisation on Purchasing
Management, 3 J. Pub. Procurement 357 (2003); Yua Wei, Corporatization and Privatization: A
Chinese Perspective, 22 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 219 (2002); Lauren Page Ambinder et al., The
Mirage Becomes Reality: Privatization and Project Finance Developments in the Middle East Power
Market, 24 Fordham Int’l L.J. 1029 (2001); Hester Lessard, The Empire of the Lone Mother:
Parental Rights, Child Welfare Law, and State Restructuring, 39 Osgoode Hall L.J. 717 (2001);
Ewell E. Murphy Jr., The Prospect for Further Energy Privatization in Mexico, 36 Tex. Int’l L.J.
75 (2001); Ellen Dannin, To Market, To Market: Legislating on Privatization and Subcontracting, 60
Md. L. Rev. 249 (2001) (the author’s biographical footnote contains a wealth of sources relating
to privatization in New Zealand); Bernard Black et al., Russian Privatization & Corporate Gover-
nance: What Went Wrong? 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1731 (2000); Tony Prosser, Public Service Law: Pri-
vatization’s Unexpected Offspring, 63 L. & Contemp. Probs. 63 (2000); Colleen Flood, Contracting
for Health Care in the Public Sector, 31 Canadian Bus. L.J. 175 (1999); Kristen V. Campana, Paying
Our Own Way: The Privatization of the Chilean Social Security System and Its Lessons for American
Reform, 20 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 385 (1999); Cento Veljanovski, Privatization in Britain, 71
Marq. L. Rev. 558 (1998); Roger Barrett James, Information—The Key to Fair Privatization: British
Successes and Russian Pitfalls, 20 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 837 (1998); Heather M. Stack,
A Comparative Analysis of German Privatization, 46 Duke L.J. 1211 (1997); Philip Nichols, Pri-
vatization in Central Asia, 29 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 299 (1997); Simon Domberger & Paul
Jensen, Contracting Out by the Public Sector: Theory, Evidence, Prospects, 13 Oxford Rev. Econ.
Pol’y 67 (1997); Maxim Boycko et al., A Theory of Privatisation, 106 Econ. J. 309 (1996); Evan
Atwood & Michael J. Trebilcock, Public Accountability in an Age of Contracting Out, 27 Canadian
Bus. L.J. 1 (1996); Michael A. Schelble, A Comparative Analysis of Privatization of Public Housing
in Great Britain and the United States, 9 Wisc. Int’l L.J. 463 (1991); Alan. S. Gutterman, Japanese
Security Markets: The Impact of the Privatization and Deregulation of Japan’s Public Enterprises, 12
U. Pa. J. Int’l Bus. L. 589 (1991).
73. This seems as good a point as any to mention that, in Paul Light’s earlier work on the
evolving “shape” of government, he focused upon growth in terms of height (reflecting increased
layers of bureaucracy) and contraction in terms of girth (identifying reductions in middle man-
agement, military base closures, and basic job cutting). See Paul C. Light, The Changing Shape of
Government, Policy Brief No. 45, at http://www.brook.edu/comm/policybriefs/pb45.htm. Light
suggests that this morphing “means that ordinary Americans will be less likely to contact a federal
employee when they call a government 800 number, write an office, or use a service . . . [and]
that the nation’s elected and appointed leaders will be further from the front lines, and less likely
to know what the public is getting for its tax dollars.”
74. “If Government is to have a larger role and yet reduce its responsibilities as public provider,
simply put, public servants will have to become better public contract managers.” John Forrer
& James Edwin Kee, Public Servants as Contract Managers? 33 Pub. Cont. L.J. 361, 367 (2004).
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sis within the government acquisition workforce is no secret.75 But the failure
to address the problem prompts a race toward chaos. Specifically, the acute
procurement personnel shortages resulted in an accelerating proliferation of
poorly structured employee augmentation personal services76 contracts with
inadequate oversight.77 That’s a troubling outlook for governing.
The root cause is the unacknowledged, unbudgeted price of effectuating
the competitive sourcing policy. Replacing government employees with con-
tractors means the Government needs more (or larger) service contracts. But
successful service contracts are tough to write. More importantly, they require
significant resources to manage. Yet, while OMB spurred agencies to out-
source functions, it made no effort to provide the resources agencies needed
to plan and conduct competitions. Nor were resources provided to manage
the successful contractors. Time magnifies these problems as the privatized
workforce grows. This would be true even if the Government had sufficient
resources to handle its ongoing procurement function. But that is not the
case, because the Government foolishly eviscerated its acquisition workforce
during the 1990s.
No one disputes the simple premise that “While managing spending ef-
fectively is always a key management responsibility, the need for effective
management is more acute in agencies that rely heavily on acquiring goods
and services to carry out their missions or support their operations.”78 As the
Office of Federal Procurement Policy articulated:
The extent of reliance on service contractors is not by itself a cause for concern.
Agencies must, however, have a sufficient number of trained and experienced staff to man-
75. “The increasing significance of contracting for services has prompted—and rightfully
so—a renewed emphasis . . . to resolve long-standing problems with service contracts. To do so,
the government must face the twin challenges of improving its acquisition of services while
simultaneously addressing human capital issues. One cannot be done without the other.” State-
ment of David E. Cooper, supra note 12, at 10. Having said that, it is unfortunate that these
issues were (and continue to be) ignored.
[M]ost of the privatization discussion . . . has beenmore concerned with ideology or supporting
. . . consulting firms than with ensuring a good deal for the taxpayer. It focused more on
assumptions about the virtues of the private sector and the presumed weaknesses of the public
sector than . . . on providing the capacity needed to ensure not only that good contracts are
developed but also that they will be effectively administered to achieve . . . the essential values
. . . in public contracting.
Cooper, supra note 69, at 9 (footnotes omitted).
76. See discussion infra at text accompanying note 105 et seq.
77. I also agree with those, like Dan Guttman, who fret that the lack of adequate oversight
capacity also is problematic for reasons unrelated to the performance of individual contractors
in terms of cost control or task completion. Guttman frets “[t]hat outsourcing will make gov-
ernment less accountable to the public. Contract employees are not listed in agency employee
directories. . . .” Peckenpaugh, supra note 7, at 49.
78. General Accounting Office, Federal Procurement: Spending and Workforce
Trends, Report to the Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, and
the Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, GAO-03–443, at 24 (2003), available
at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03443.pdf.
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age Government programs properly.The greater the degree of reliance on contractors
the greater the need for oversight by agencies.79
Unfortunately, no one seems willing to pay the price.
B. The Looming Acquisition Workforce Crisis
[G]overnmentwide reductions in the acquisition workforce along with a number
of procurement reforms—including an increased reliance on services provided by
commercial firms . . . have placed unprecedented demands on the federal acquisi-
tion workforce.80
Despite clear mandates requiring agencies to contract out government
functions, no concurrent emphasis has been placed upon retaining or obtain-
ing skilled professionals to plan for, compete, award, or manage these so-
phisticated long-term service contracts. Sadly, there are not enough qualified
acquisition professionals or buyers left in the Federal Government to do the
job.81 Nor are there enough experts to define the various tasks government
employees perform and then evaluate whether the private sector can outper-
form the Government. And, once the contractors are chosen, there are in-
sufficient specialists to ensure the Government gets what it pays for.
Granted, both executive and legislative branch pressure prompted the re-
duction in the size of the federal bureaucracy. Both political parties reveled
in, and claim credit for having contributed to, the reduction in size of the
Federal Government. None preached caution at the time. But this effort,
particularly in this context, was penny wise and pound foolish.
During the government downsizing frenzy of the 1990s, however, agencies
routinely deemed their acquisition professionals nonessential to their core
missions. Accordingly, buyers, auditors, contract specialists, and quality as-
surance personnel were jettisoned in waves,82 at rates far more severe than
79. Policy Letter from Allan V. Burman, Administrator, Office of Federal Procurement Policy
(OFPP), to the Heads of Executive Agencies and Departments, No. 92–1, § (7)(h) (Sept. 23,
1992) [hereinafter OFPP Policy Letter 92–1], at http://www.arnet.gov/Library/OFPP/
PolicyLetters/Letters/PL92–1.html (emphasis added).
80. Letter from David M. Walker to Senators John Ensign and Daniel Akaka, March 19
Hearing on Sourcing and Acquisition—Questions for the Record, GAO-03–771R (May 23,
2003) [hereinafter Walker Letter] (citing GAO-03–443, supra note 78).
81. Nowhere is this more clear than at the Defense Department, which accounts for more
than 60 percent of the federal procurement budget. “Between fiscal years 1990 and 2001, the
Department of Defense’s (DOD) acquisition workforce was reduced significantly—bymore than
50 percent. At the same time, DOD’s contracting workload increased by 12 percent.” Walker
Letter, supra note 80.
82. The acquisition workforce experienced a sustained, dramatic, congressionally mandated
reduction in force, leaving the Government’s buyers overwhelmed, undertrained, retirement
eligible, and ill-suited to meet the daunting demands they faced. See, e.g., DoD Acquisition
Workforce Report, supra note 44. The DoD Inspector General reported an acquisitionworkforce
reduction from 460,156 in 1991 to 230,556 in 1999. “DOD’s total workforce and acquisition
workforce have declined by 9 percent since fiscal year 1997, continuing a decade-long decline
that began in the early 1990s.” GAO-03–443, supra note 78, at 32; General Accounting Office,
Acquisition Workforce: Department of Defense’s Plans to Address Workforce Size and
Structure Challenges, GAO-02–630, at 2 (2002), at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02630.
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those experienced in the across-the-board downsizing.83 While I continue to
bemoan the systematic procurement personnel reductions, little point is
served in revisiting the Faustian bargains made. The reformers consented to
deep personnel cuts in exchange for the increased flexibility that defines the
1990s acquisition reforms.84 Only after the fact did senior leadership concede
the stark ramifications of the acquisition workforce purge.85
That’s a shame, because little (and arguably no) empirical evidence sup-
ported the procurement personnel reductions at the time. The trend in work-
force reduction could not have been more poorly timed, in that it coincided
with an era of aggressive acquisition reform.86 Implementation of reforms
suffered because the increased workload on remaining personnel denied them
the opportunity to receive the training needed to learn the new skills required
pdf (“Between 1989 and 1999, DOD downsized its civilian acquisition workforce by almost 50
percent to about 124,000 personnel as of September 30, 1999.”). These reductions came through
mandated 10 or 15 percent cuts each year. See, e.g., the National Defense Authorization Act for
2000, Pub. L. No. 106–65, § 922, 113 Stat. 512, 724 (1999). While the lion’s share of analysis
focuses upon the Defense Department, which experienced the most dramatic cuts, GAO leaves
no doubt that its “concerns are equally valid regarding the broader civilian agency contracting
community.” Statement of David E. Cooper, supra note 12, at 8. For a graphic illustration, see
Figure 7, Commercial Activities Panel Report, supra note 11, at 30.
83. In 1997, the Defense Department reported that
When comparing the . . . acquisition workforce . . . results to other areas . . ., acquisitionwork-
force reductions outpace all of them. During this FY89–FY01 period when the Departments
estimated a 48% personnel reduction in acquisition organizations, there is a corresponding
32% reduction in active duty military . . ., estimates for total civilian personnel reductions are
28.6% . . .[.] Additionally, . . . estimates for total federal employment reductions in the FY89–
FY01 period are 18.6%.
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition & Technology), Right-Sizing the
Department of Defense Acquisition Workforce 28 (1997), at http://www.dau.mil/career/
files/906rpt.pdf. See also The Acquisition 2005Task Force, Final Report: Shaping the Civilian
Acquisition Workforce of the Future (2000) [hereinafter Acquisition Task Force Final Re-
port], at http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/Docs/report1000.pdf (“Over the last decade, the rate of
reduction in the civilian acquisition workforce has substantially exceeded that of the rest of the
DoD workforce.” Id. at ES-3.). Moreover, DoD “projects additional losses approaching 50 per-
cent in some key acquisition occupations primarily due to retirement over the next 5 to 6 years.”
Id. at 2.
84. “Acquisition reforms, as one downsizing driver, help make it possible to achieve the mis-
sion with a smaller workforce.” Under Secretary of Defense, supra note 83, at 8. “The FY
1996 actual reductions and estimates of further right sizing . . . indicate payoff from numerous
prior plans, studies and activities. The long term results . . . reflect a continued emphasis on active
management . . . in the acquisition community. The Department is confident of our ability to
achieve further improvements and achieving the reductions currently planned for in FY 2000,
while posturing our acquisition workforce to fully support diverse mission requirements in the
21st century.” Id. at 5.
85. ‘‘The Department of Defense (DoD) is facing a crisis that can dramatically affect our
Nation’s ability to provide warfighters with modern weapon systems needed to defend our na-
tional interests. After eleven consecutive years of downsizing, we face serious imbalances in the
skills and experience of our highly talented and specialized civilian workforce.’’ Action Memo-
randum (Oct. 11, 2000), in Acquisition Task Force Final Report, supra note 83.
86. See, e.g., Steven Kelman, Remaking Federal Procurement, 31 Pub. Cont. L.J. 581 (2002);
Stephen M. Daniels, An Assessment of Today’s Federal Procurement System, 38 Procurement Law. 1
(2002); Steven L. Schooner, Change, Change Leadership, and Acquisition Reform, 26 Pub. Cont.
L.J. 467 (1997).
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by the reformed regime.87 The steady pace of reductions proved devastating
to procurement personnel morale, and these professionals saw little to suggest
optimism in the future. The mandated workforce reductions not only meant
a rapidly aging and retirement-eligible workforce,88 but they also foreclosed
new hires (and the resulting failure to infuse “new blood” into the procure-
ment workforce). A Defense Department Inspector General concluded that
the personnel reductions resulted in, among other things, insufficient staff to
manage requirements; reduced scrutiny in reviewing acquisition actions; dif-
ficulties retaining personnel; and insufficient contract surveillance.89
Fortunately, this troubling trend seems to have stalled. But nothing suggests
a pending reversal of the trend.90 That leaves a void. While the procurement
workforce shrank, the number of acquisitions—both the total and those inexcess
of $100,000, which absorb more energy and effort—increased. A steady stream
of evidence demonstrates the crippling impact of an inadequately staffed acqui-
sition workforce, for example, at Housing and Urban Development,91 NASA,92
87. GAO explains: “Changes in what the government buys, its contracting approaches and
methods, and its acquisition workforce combine to create a dynamic acquisition environment. . . .
However, our work has found that the lack of proper training, guidance, and internal controls
can increase an agency’s procurement risk and lead to reduced public confidence.” GAO-03–
443, supra note 78, at 24.
88. According to DoD’s Acquisition 2005 Task Force, eleven consecutive years of downsizing
produced serious imbalances in the skills and experience of the highly talented and specialized
civilian acquisition workforce, putting DoD on the verge of a retirement-driven talent drain.
Statement of David E. Cooper, supra note 12, at 7 (citing Acquisition Task Force Final Report,
supra note 83).
89. DoD Acquisition Workforce Report, supra note 44, at 17–20.
90. See, e.g., GAO-03–443, supra note 78.
91. See, e.g., General Accounting Office, HUD Management: Action Needed to Improve
Acquisition Management, Report to Congressional Requesters, GAO-03–157 (2002), at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03157.pdf; HUD Faces Challenges Effectively Overseeing Contrac-
tors, GAO Says, 44 Gov. Contractor ¶ 470 (Nov. 27, 2002). Like many other agencies, HUD
dramatically downsized its staff—including its procurement staff—during the 1990s, despite the
fact that its workload did not decrease. (GAO described a “serious staffing shortage” and referred
to the Office of the Chief Procurement Officer (OCPO) as “an organization in crisis.”) Like
other agencies, HUD today relies more heavily upon private contractors. Thus, consistent with
the experience at other agencies, HUD has more contracts to award and administer, and fewer
professionals to perform this work. Not surprisingly, the procurement training story is a sad one.
Although HUD disputed this finding, GAO reported that HUD’s centralized training records
indicated that 89 percent of HUD’s Contracting Officers, contract specialists, procurement an-
alysts, and purchasing agents do not meet federal training requirements. Over half of the gov-
ernment technical representatives (GTRs) had not received the trainingmandated by theClinger-
Cohen Act in 1996. Only 7 percent of HUD’s 495 government technical monitors (GTMs) had
received any specialized training.
92. See Office of Inspector General, Audit Report: NASA Contracts for Professional,
Administrative, and Management Support Services, IG-03–003 (2002), at http://www.
hq.nasa.gov/office/oig/hq/ig-03–003.pdf. Among other things, the IG reports:
Over the last decade, Federal agencies, including NASA, have substantially increased their
purchases of services. . . . Prior [IG] audits identified management control weaknesses related
to support services contracts. These weaknesses included, in part, inadequate competition and
a lack of cost control. . . . NASA can improve its award and management of support services
contracts. For three of the five support services contracts reviewed, contractors did not obtain
adequate competition for . . . 59 percent of . . . subcontracts awarded. . . . NASA did not max-
Competitive Sourcing Policy: More Sail Than Rudder? 287
and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).93
Now, after a decade of arbitrary procurement workforce reductions, Con-
gress simply demands that buyers “do more with less.” That’s posturing, not
policy, and it is terribly irresponsible.94 The result is an insufficient workforce
to manage the contracting-out burden. Nor is reliance upon the private sector
an attractive option, to the extent that, historically, the procurement function
was deemed inherently governmental.95 Not surprisingly, GAO found that
it is becoming increasingly evident that agencies are at risk of not having enough of
the right people with the right skills to manage service procurements. Consequently, a
key question we face in the government is whether we have today, or will have to-
morrow, the ability to acquire and manage the procurement of increasingly sophisticated
services the government needs.96
imize opportunities to facilitate the use of fixed-price contracting for routine administrative
services with reasonably definite requirements. As a result, NASA assumed more risk than
necessary because the use of cost-type contracts rather than fixed-price contracts canminimize
the contractor’s incentive to control costs and perform effectively. In addition, cost-type con-
tracts can be more costly and burdensome for NASA to administer due to more stringent
contract reporting and review requirements.
NASA IG Report Finds Agency Needs to Improve Award andManagement of Support Services Contracts,
44 Gov. Contractor ¶ 446 (Nov. 13, 2002). See also Office of Inspector General, Audit
Report: Procurement Workforce Planning, IG-01–041 (Sept. 27, 2001), at http://www.hq.
nasa.gov/office/oig/hq/ig-01–041.pdf (NASA lacks enough adequately trained acquisition pro-
fessionals to handle its future procurement workload demands). In the broader context, see Co-
lumbia Accident Investigation Board Report (Oct. 28, 2003), at http://www.nasa.gov/columbia;
Greg Schneider & Ariana Eunjung Cha, Cost-Conscious NASA Relies on Contract Firms, Wash.
Post., Feb. 3, 2003, at A17; David H. Johnson et al., NASA’s Restructuring Through Privatization:
A View to Its Impact on Procurement, 34 Procurement Law. 1 (1999).
93. See, e.g., General Accounting Office, Contract Management: INS Contracting
Weaknesses Need Attention from the Department of Homeland Security, Report to the
Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, GAO-03–799 ( July 25,
2003), at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03799.pdf; John Cibinic, Contract Mismanagement: The
GAO Gives the Agency an “F”, 17 Nash & Cibnic Rep. ¶ 50 (Oct. 2003).
94. A classic example is the clearly ignored mandate:
When contracting for services, it is the policy of the Federal Government that . . . d. Sufficient
trained and experienced officials are available within the agency to manage and oversee the
contract administration function[; and] e. Effective management practices are used to imple-
ment the guiding principles contained herein to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse in services
contracting.
Policy Letter from Steven Kelman, Administrator, OFPP, to theHeads of ExecutiveDepartments
and Establishments, No. 93–1, ¶ 7 (May 18, 1994) [hereinafter OFPP Policy Letter 93–1], at
http://www.acqnet.gov/Library/OFPP/PolicyLetters/Letters/PL93–1.html.
95. “Governmental functions normally fall into two categories: (1) the act of governing . . .
and (2) monetary transactions. . . .” Moreover, “[a]n inherently governmental function involves
. . . the interpretation and execution of the laws . . . so as to . . . exert ultimate control over the
acquisition . . . of the property . . . of the United States, including the . . . control, or disbursement
of appropriated . . . funds. . . .” OFPP Policy Letter 92–1, supra note 79, at §§ 5, 5(e). See also
Ralph C. Nash & John Cibinic, Contracting Out Procurement Functions: The “Inherently Govern-
mental Function” Exception, 14 Nash & Cibinic Rep. ¶ 45 (Sept. 2000). Professors Nash and
Cibinic lay out the test for determining whether the Government can provide sufficient oversight
of contracted service functions and conclude by “wonder[ing] whether some agencies have
enough personnel left in-house to provide the proper answers to the questions.”
96. Statement of David E. Cooper, supra note 12, at 1 (emphasis added). Moreover, “agencies
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Demands upon overtaxed acquisition corps lead to a triage-type focus on
buying, which has severely limited the resources available for contract ad-
ministration. Agencies must apply their limited resources to meet their most
pressing needs. When faced with applying limited resources, agencies focus
first upon awarding contracts and less upon administering those contracts once
awarded.97 This point merits emphasis—the Government lacks the people
needed to manage the contracts necessary to replace the outsourced govern-
ment personnel. Steve Kelman, chief architect of the 1990s acquisition re-
forms, now concedes that “the administration of contracts once they have
been signed has been the neglected stepchild of [procurement system reform]
effort.”98 More broadly, the cuts diminished internal (or government over-
sight) of the contracting process.99 This is a recipe for disaster that hides
significant downstream costs.
Nor did the Government invest in sufficient training for existing (or re-
maining) personnel to learn how to transform Government.100 The well-
are not clearly defining their requirements, fully considering alternative solutions, performing
vigorous price analyses, and adequately overseeing contractor performance.” Id.
97. For example, “Four of the 14 DoD acquisition organizations believed that less oversight
will be placed on contracts for administrative review as the organizations experience more work-
force reductions.” DoD Acquisition Workforce Report, supra note 44, at 31. Further:
In this regard, DCMC [the Defense Contract Management Command] commented that some
contractors stated that when DCMC stopped performing inspections of all products, so did
the contractors. As a result of the lack of inspections and recent failures with hardware in the
Space Program, DCMC is concerned that it may have reduced its quality assurance program
too much. Also, DLA [the Defense Logistics Agency] stated that customer complaints about
the quality of material received ha[ve] increased; however, it has placed less emphasis on re-
sponding to the customer complaints because of acquisition workforce reductions.
Id. at 77.
98. Steven Kelman, Strategic Contracting Management, in Donahue & Nye, supra note 69, at
88, 89–90, citing, inter alia, Donald F. Kettl, Government by Proxy: (Mis?)Managing Fed-
eral Programs (1988) (with a reference to the “hollow state”). Kelman observes: “The most
fundamental problem with the current system is that it insufficiently recognizes contract admin-
istration as in the first instance a management function.” Id. at 93. See also General Accounting
Office, Contract Management: No DoD Proposal to Improve Contract Service Costs
Reporting, Report to Congressional Committees, GAO-01–295 (2001), at http://
www.gao.gov/new.items/d01295.pdf (as an example).
99. Schooner, supra note 41, at 671–72 (including the graphic on page 672). For example,
between 1990 and 1999, the number of “accounting and budget” personnel within the acquisition
workforce fell from 17,504 to 6,432, a decrease of 63 percent. The cumulative reduction in these
specialties is more dramatic, because these figures exclude “the Defense Contract Audit Agency[,
whose] staffing decreased from 7,030 work years in FY 1990 to 3,958 in FY 1999, a reduction
of about 44 percent.” Further, during the same period, the number of “quality assurance, in-
spection, and grading” personnel fell from 12,117 to 5,191, a decrease of 57 percent. DoD
Acquisition Workforce Report, supra note 44.
100. Fortunately, some attention has been paid to this problem, particularly through the long-
pending Services Acquisition Reform Act of 2003 (SARA), relentlessly championed by Repre-
sentative TomDavis of Virginia. Section 1412 of SARAwould create a training fund from revenue
skimmed from agency purchases through the General Services Administration’s Federal Supply
Schedule. See, e.g., Title XIV,Military Personnel Authorizations,NationalDefenseAuthorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2004, H.R. 1588, conference report, at http://www.house.gov/rules/
H1588_CR.PDF, which included portions of SARA, previously H.R. 1837. See, e.g., Press Re-
lease, Congressman Tom Davis, Defense Authorization Conference Report Includes Davis Procurement
Reforms (Nov. 7, 2003), at http://tomdavis.house.gov/cgi-data/news/files/67.shtml. While I laud
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intentioned promises of theDefense AcquisitionWorkforce ImprovementAct
(DAWIA) and the Clinger-Cohen Act remain underfunded and, accordingly,
unfulfilled.101 Asking this workforce, without additional resources, to handle
this burden is fiscally irresponsible,102 but no longer surprising. The following
exchange between two Senators and the Comptroller General is elucidating:
Q. Would you agree that the challenges of meeting the Administration’s goals for
public-private competition, and of managing services contracts that result from
such competition are more likely to require an increase in acquisition resources
rather than a decrease?
A. The . . . goals . . . could have a significant impact on the acquisition workforce
in a number of ways. . . . [T]he current process for conducting these competi-
tions is complicated, and therefore requires a skilled acquisition workforce to
support the studies. Any changes to the process will require additional resources
for training and perhaps additional personnel. . . . [T]he number of positions
proposed for study . . . is higher than in the past, greatly increasing the com-
petitive sourcing workload. . . . [T]o the extent that an increase in competitive
sourcing studies results in an increase in the award of service contracts . . .,
agencies will need to ensure that they have a sufficient acquisition workforce
in numbers and abilities to administer those contracts effectively.103
Despite this obvious need for additional resources, no effort has beenmade
to increase or upgrade the acquisition workforce. Faced with ballooning def-
icits, Congress is paralyzed.104 Like an ostrich, head in the sand, Congress
sees no way to provide the resources agencies need to transform themselves.
C. Employee Augmentation and Personal Services
One particularly unfortunate outcome is the Government’s increased re-
liance on employee augmentation and personal services contracts.105 Histori-
any effort to invest in acquisition training, I remain less than enthusiastic about this enterprise
because Congress should fund necessary training programs through the normal budget and ap-
propriations process.
101. Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA), 10 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1707,
and The Clinger-Cohen Act, Pub. L. No. 104–106, § 4307 (1996) (adding 41 U.S.C. § 433).
102. See, e.g., Richard Stillman II, The American Bureaucracy: The Core of Modern
Government 307–09 (2d ed. 1996) (suggesting that the growth of contracting out has “tended
to accelerate numerous problems and dilemmas of managerial efficiency, oversight, and account-
ability”).
103. Walker Letter, supra note 80, at 4–5.
104. See, e.g., David M. Walker, Truth and Transparency: The Federal Government’s Finan-
cial Condition and Fiscal Outlook, Remarks at the National Press Club (Sept. 17, 2003), available
at http://www.gao.gov/cghome/npc917.pdf (accompanying slides available at http://www.gao.
gov/cghome/npc917/); America’s Deficits, supra note 66 (“There will be no ‘peace dividend’ from
the end of the cold war (indeed, the pressure on military spending may continue to increase).
America is unlikely to see another stock market bubble, with its surge in tax revenues. As baby-
boomers retire, the pressure from entitlement spending will be more acute. Set against this
background, the path back to a sustainable fiscal policy will be extremely painful, even without
any dramatic fiscal crisis.”)
105. This problem is not new. See, e.g., GAO/GGD-92–11, supra note 38, at 3–4 (“the major
reasons that agencies use contractors to administer some functions that may be governmental in
nature are the lack of authorized federal positions for employees and the lack of federal employees
with sufficient expertise to do the work”). What is new is the increased severity of the problem.
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cally, contracting in this manner was prohibited by statute or regulation and
further discouraged in policy and practice.106 But that line has been breached.
Knowledgeable procurement professionals and experienced government con-
tracts attorneys concede that this dirty little secret is no longer little. What
is particularly intriguing about this phenomenon, however, is how it neutral-
izes one of the most significant ongoing acquisition reform initiatives,
performance-based service contracting. In order to appreciate the problem,
some background on contract types may prove helpful.
Government procurement law, policy, and practice historically distin-
guished contracts for services (ranging from custodial to, in this case, clerical
and medical) from those for supplies (end items or widgets, ranging from fur-
niture to fighter aircraft) and construction (designing, building, repairing, or
renovating structures or, generally, improving real estate). The Federal Ac-
quisition Regulation (FAR)107 defines a service contract as “a contract that
directly engages the time and effort of a contractor whose primary purpose
is to perform an identifiable task rather than to furnish an end item of supply.”108
Conventional wisdom acknowledges that service contracts, in addition to
being difficult to write well, have a tendency to require more contract man-
agement resources than supply contracts. The Office of Federal Procurement
Policy aptly states: “Contracting for services is especially complex and de-
mands close collaboration between procurement personnel and the users of
the service to ensure that contractor performance meets contract require-
ments and performance standards.”109 Hiring contractors to replace experi-
enced workers to perform a task is more complicated than buying a widget,
whether an appliance, a car, or even a new home.110 If you’ve ever relied on
a contractor to remodel your kitchen or bathroom, think how much time you
spent choosing your contractor, then looking over his or her shoulder.111
Within the universe of service contracts, the field again subdivides, distin-
guishing personal services contracts from nonpersonal services contracts. In a
nonpersonal services contract (the historical norm in federal procurement),
106. See infra notes 113–15 and accompanying text.
107. Title 48 of the C.F.R.
108. 48 C.F.R. § 37.101 (2002) (emphasis added).
109. OFPP Policy Letter 93–1, supra note 94, at ¶ 7.
110. In this context, Hartley cautions that significant risks are inherent in the performance of
these contracts, particularly in the defense arena. “[P]rivate firms will have a ‘gilt-edged’ guar-
anteed income stream; they are experts on their production function and cost conditions; their
‘in-house’ rivals will have been eliminated; and they will seek opportunities to economize or
default on those aspects of the contract which have not been specified completely (e.g., aspects
of service quality).” Hartley, supra note 1, at 297.
111. Granted, not all service contracts are alike.
While effective management oversight is required for all types of service contracts, some re-
quire less oversight than others, as, for example, such routine services as lawn mowing and
food preparation. Conversely, services that tend to affect Government decision-making, support or
influence policy development, or affect program management are more susceptible to abuse. These,
therefore, require a greater level of scrutiny.
OFPP Policy Letter 93–1, supra note 94, at ¶ 7 (emphasis added).
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the Government delegates a task or function to a contractor. These tasks
might include operating a mess hall (specifically, serving meals to a population
of soldiers); performing custodial services (such as cleaning a court house);
overhauling an aircraft engine; training an organization on a specified skill;
or operating an information technology help desk. The Government dele-
gates the task to the contractor, and the contractor directs its employees to
complete the task.112 Conversely, in personal services contracts, the Govern-
ment retains the function, but contractor employees staff the effort. “A per-
sonal services contract is characterized by the employer-employee relationship
it creates between the Government and the contractor’s personnel.”113 Al-
though pending legislation would increase flexibility in this regard,114 the
Government operates under longstanding legal and policy objections to the
use of personal services contracts.115
A common form of personal services contract is referred to as the body shop
or employee augmentation arrangement. As the name implies, the Government
uses this type of contract to hire contractor personnel to replace, supplement,
or work alongside civil servants or members of the armed forces. As a matter
of practice and necessity, the Federal Government today relies heavily upon
this type of employee augmentation contract. This reliance is driven by the
juxtaposition of the two trends discussed above: (1) increased government
downsizing and (2) targeted acquisition workforce reductions. The impact of
this trend, and the associated open-ended contracts with imprecise (if not
intentionally vague) work statements, is troubling. Rather than hire contrac-
tors to perform tasks, the Government hires contractor personnel to act like
the predecessor government employees.116
Contrast this with the contract model to which the Government aspires.
112. “‘Nonpersonal services contract’ means a contract under which the personnel rendering
the services are not subject, either by the contract’s terms or by the manner of its administration,
to the supervision and control usually prevailing in relationships between the Government and
its employees.” 48 C.F.R. § 37.101 (2002).
113. 48 C.F.R. § 37.104(a) (2002). “An employer-employee relationship under a service con-
tract occurs when, as a result of (i) the contract’s terms or (ii) the manner of its administration
during performance, contractor personnel are subject to the relatively continuous supervision
and control of a Government officer or employee.” 48 C.F.R. § 37.104(c)(1) (2002).
114. See, e.g., Subtitle D, Section 841 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2004, Additional Authority to Enter into Personal Services Contracts.
115. The basic procurement regulation explains: “Agencies shall not award personal services
contracts unless specifically authorized by statute . . . to do so.” 48 C.F.R. § 37.104(b) (2002).
The FAR offers a list of descriptive elements to assess whether a proposed contract is personal
in nature. 48 C.F.R. § 37.104(d) (2002).
116. In response to my op-ed piece, Downsizing Government on the Cheap, Star-Ledger, Sept.
28, 2003, Perspective, at 6, I received the following e-mail from an experienced practitioner:
[F]rom [the] practical standpoint of advising companies doing (or trying to do) business with
the government, the current procurement system has degenerated in parts into a wild west of
sorts from the solicitation process to contract administration. That there is “no one guarding
the hen house”—other than perhaps the outsourced “Wily Fox Guard Service”—increasingly
seems to be the rule. . . . At the front end, if your company did not have some say in the work
statement, likely you are not in the picture. Schedule purchases all too often seem to be wired.
Once in, there appears to be precious little oversight. [The i]mpact is that incumbents on vague
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In nonpersonal services contracts, the definition of the task is paramount.
Over the last decade, the process of task description—the drafting of state-
ments of work—resulted in an extensive, pervasive push to embrace a
performance-based contracting scenario. In performance-based contracting,
the entire process focuses upon performance achieved rather than effort ex-
pended.117 We call this approach performance-based service contracting, or
PBSC, and, today, it is the model for procuring services preferred by statute,
regulation, and policy.118 My predecessors, Professors Emeriti Ralph Nash
and John Cibinic, explained that “[P]erformance-based contracting is con-
trasted with contracting using . . . work statements that specify . . . the work
force that must be furnished.”119 Accordingly,
Performance-based service contracting (PBSC) emphasizes that all aspects of an ac-
quisition be structured around the purpose of the work to be performed as opposed to the
manner in which the work is to be performed. . . . It is designed to ensure that con-
tractors are given freedom to determine how to meet the Government’s perfor-
mance objectives, that appropriate performance quality levels are achieved, and that
payment is made only for services that meet these levels.120
The Government’s early PBSC policy guidance elaborates: “When pre-
service contracts are so entrenched, with so little oversight, there is little chance for [an]
improved newcomer to break in on re-competes.
E-mail on file with the author. Another experienced practitioner, Joseph Petrillo, recently cap-
tured the essence of this race to the bottom in his column, Federal Contract Law: How Not to Place
Contract Orders, 22: 25 Gov. Computer News, Sept. 1, 2003, at http://www.gcn.com/22_25/
manager/23337–1.html.
117. See also 48 C.F.R. § 37.601 (2002) (“Performance-based contracts (a) Describe the re-
quirements in terms of results required . . . ; (b) Use measurable performance standards (i.e.,
terms of quality, timeliness, quantity, etc.) . . .; and (d) Include performance incentives where
appropriate.”).
118. 48 C.F.R. § 37.102(a) (2002), citing Pub. L. No. 106–398, section 821, and cross-
referencing 48 C.F.R. Subpart 37.6.(2002). See generally Policy Letter from Allan V. Burman,
Administrator, OFPP, to The Heads of Executive Agencies and Departments, No. 91–2 (Apr. 9,
1991) [hereinafter OFPP Policy Letter 91–2], at http://www.arnet.gov/Library/OFPP/
PolicyLetters/Letters/PL91–2_4–9-91.html (officially commencing the Government’s initia-
tive); General Accounting Office, Contract Management: Guidance Needed for Using
Performance-Based Service Contracting, Appendix III: Major Performance-Based Service
Contracting Events 2, GAO-02–1049 (2002) (“To achieve greater cost savings and better
outcomes with [the more than $130 billion spent each year acquiring services] . . ., the Congress
and the administration have encouraged greater use of performance-based service contracting.”);
Paul J. Seidman et al., Service Contracting in the NewMillennium—Part I, Briefing Papers (2002),
citing Moving Forward with Services Acquisition Reform: Hearing Before the SubComm. on Technology
and Procurement Policy, House Committee on Government Reform, 107th Cong. 24–42 (2002) (state-
ment of Angela B. Styles, OFPP Administrator); Lawrence L. Martin,Making Performance-Based
Contracting Perform: What the Federal Government Can Learn from State and Local Governments, in
Abramson & Harris, supra note 69, at ch. 4.
119. Ralph C. Nash & John Cibinic, Performance-Based Service Contracting: The New FAR
Guidance, 11 Nash & Cibinic Rep. ¶ 56 (Nov. 1997) (emphasis added). Moreover, “[t]he theory
of performance-based contracting is . . . that the Government will benefit . . . if the contractor
is permitted to devise the most efficient and effective way to perform the work.”
120. Office of Federal Procurement Policy, A Guide to Best Practices for
Performance-Based Service Contracting 4 (final ed., Oct. 1998) (emphasis added) [herein-
after Best Practices Guide], at http://www.arnet.gov/Library/OFPP/BestPractices/PPBSC/
BestPPBSC.html.
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paring statements of work, agencies shall, to the maximum extent practicable,
describe the work in terms of ‘what’ is to be the required output rather than
‘how’ the work is to be accomplished.”121 In other words: “The PBSC [work
statement] describes the effort in terms of measurable performance standards
(outputs). These standards should include such elements as ‘what, when,
where, how many, and how well’ the work is to be performed.”122 The Office
of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) later added:
Agencies . . . should not include detailed procedures in the [work statement] that
dictate how work is to be accomplished. Instead, they should structure the [work
statement] around the purpose of the work to be performed, i.e., what is to be
performed, rather than how to perform it. For example, instead of requiring that
the lawn be mowed weekly, or that trees be pruned each Fall, state that the lawn
must be maintained between 2–3” or that tree limbs not touch utility wires or
buildings.123
The OFPP’s Best Practices Guide also provides some lessons learned or
success stories. For example, routine vehicular maintenance tasks might be
purchased for a fixed price124 or custodial work might be described to com-
mercial standards.125 But what is important is that “[t]he contract does not specify
how many plane captains, mechanics or parachute riggers are required to be in a crew
or on the job.”126
But these examples do not reflect a broad-based successful evolution to-
ward performance-based contracting.127 Instead, the Government has strug-
gled to adopt performance-based service contracting as the norm.128 This is
not surprising, given the difficulty in performing the task well.129 Sometimes,
121. OFPP Policy Letter 91–2, supra note 118.
122. Best Practices Guide, supra note 120, ch. 2.
123. Id., ch. 4.
124. For example: “A GSA vehicle maintenance specification for service calls was changed
from an hourly rate to a price-per-occurrence. This resulted in a noticeable difference in the
contract price.” Id.
125. For example: “The Air Force found that it saved 50 percent by specifying that floors
must be clean, free of scuff marks and dirt, and have a uniformly glossy finish, rather than
requiring that the contractor strip and rewax the floors weekly.” Id.
126. For example: “Under the Navy contract for aircraft maintenance, the contractor is held
to a standard of performance and is empowered to use best commercial practices andmanagement
innovation in performance.” Id. (emphasis added).
127. See, e.g., GAO-03–443, supra note 78, at 18–19. In Fiscal Year 2001, the Government
awarded slightly less than a quarter of its service contract dollars through performance-based
contracts. While NASA spent approximately two-thirds of its service dollars through
performance-based contracts, no other agency approached one-third. Three agencies (Agricul-
ture, Treasury, and the Veterans Administration) awarded fewer than 10 percent. But see id.,
notes accompanying fig. 7, in which two agencies dispute GAO’s data.
128. For example, the GAO found that
DOD has . . . been challenged to implement performance-based service contracting. . . .DOD,
like other agencies we reviewed had achieved mixed success in incorporating four basic
performance-based metrics into its contracts. . . . Our report also raised concern as to whether
agencies have a good understanding of performance-based contracting and how to take full
advantage of it.
Walker Letter, supra note 80, citing GAO-02–1049, supra note 118.
129. “Writing complete contracts is problematic and costly.” Hartley, supra note 1, at 290.
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agencies do not even try. With this diffusion of responsibility, accountability
suffers. “Accountability requires defined objectives, processes and controls for
achieving those objectives, methods to track success or deviation from objec-
tives, feedback to affected parties, and enforcement mechanisms to align de-
sired objectives with actual performance.”130 Loss of accountability is too high
a price to pay.
The alternative to the performance-based approach is all too often that
agencies merely purchase labor or “fill seats.” Contracts do not specifically
describe tasks to be performed, but instead merely state manpower require-
ments and labor category descriptions. The distinction is one well known to
the defense acquisition community, as articulated in the DoD guidebook:
Previously, manpower requirements were commonly prescribed in terms of “re-
quired number of bodies” or by using other qualifiers such as college degrees or
specific years of experience. Prescribing manpower requirements limits the ability
of offerors to propose their best solutions, and it could preclude the use of con-
tractors’ qualified personnel, who may be well suited for performing the require-
ment but may lack, for example, a college degree or the exact years of specified
experience.131
That’s what the Government’s buyers have been reduced to—filling empty
seats with substitute employees. That’s not the way to achieve the type of
objectives—increased quality, cost savings, efficiency, etc.—typically sought
in a principled outsourcing regime. Nor will the trend toward greater reliance
on time and materials contracts further the ends desired by the Govern-
ment.132 But the convergence of outsourcing policy with poorly planned ac-
130. “Accountability serves to assure federal workers, the private sector, and the taxpayers
that the sourcing process is efficient and effective. Accountability also protects the government’s
interest by ensuring that agencies receive what they are promised, in terms of both quality and
cost. . . .” Commercial Activities Panel Report, supra note 11, at 36.
131. Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Reform,
Performance-Based Service Acquisition 11 (2001), at http://www.dau.mil/pubs/misc/
PBSA_GUIDEBOOK.pdf.
132. Section 1432 of the pending SARA legislation, supra note 100, would broaden the Gov-
ernment’s flexibility to rely upon time and materials (T&M) contracts. “The legislation clarifies
the existing statutory definition of commercial item to authorize the use of time and material
and labor-hour type contracts for certain commercial services that are commonly sold to the
public through such contracts and are purchased by the Government on a competitive basis.” Id.
This issue spawns strong reactions. See, e.g., Ralph C. Nash & John Cibinic, Time-and-Materials
and Labor-Hour Contracts, 17 Nash & Cibinic Rep. ¶ 19 (Apr. 2003) (including a letter from Vern
Edwards asserting that the “agency . . . would have been better off with a cost-plus-fixed-fee
contract than a time-and-materials contract” and that “time-and-materials contracts are always
worse deals for the Government than cost-reimbursement contracts, and their use can be justified
only by necessity and conformity with standard commercial practice”); Ralph C. Nash & John
Cibinic, Time-and-Materials and Labor-Hour Contracts, 17 Nash & Cibinic Rep. ¶ 9 (Feb. 2003)
(discussing the CACI case); John Cibinic, Time-and-Materials Contracts: A Different View, 13Nash
& Cibinic Rep. ¶ 56 (Oct. 1999) (including a letter from Vern Edwards arguing that a “T&M
contract is the worst of all pricing arrangements. . . . A buyer should use it only when its use is
standard commercial practice and when there is no practical alternative.”); Michael K. Love,
Labor-Hour and Time-and-Materials Contracting, 13 Nash & Cibinic Rep. ¶ 24 (May 1999) (“pro-
pos[ing] that, while the goal must continue to be to find reasonable ways to use firm-fixed-priced
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quisition workforce reductions leaves agencies and their procurement profes-
sionals little choice.
IV. CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF COMPETITIVE SOURCING
All of which brings me back to a simple problem. It seems disingenuous
to rush to eliminate government employees and hire contractor replacements
without a plan and (this may be equally, if not more, important) the resources
to execute the plan.
Unclear policy hinders, often irreparably, implementation. If people know
what the goal is, it is easier to achieve it. Herein lies the rub. Two conflicting
goals compete for dominance. One vision entails Government that does not
compete with the private sector, performing only that work which, by its very
nature, the state must perform. Another vision demands that Government
provide its services in the most cost-effective manner. Either vision would
recognize an increase in the volume and complexity of service contracts that
the Government competes, awards, and manages. Accordingly, fulfilling ei-
ther aspiration requires appropriate acquisition resources to avoid large-scale
waste and inefficiency. But the administration’s competitive sourcing policy
is animated by neither vision; hence it frets less over the details of successful
implementation.
My suggestions are simple. The Government should revisit the now-
defunct, but principled and rational, policy that the Government should not
compete with the private sector. By truncating the language in the original
OMB Circular A-76 to delete the cost savings predicate, a simple policy
emerges:
The Federal Government shall rely on commercially available sources to provide
commercial products and services. The Government shall not start or carry on any
activity to provide a commercial product or service.
With that as a guide, serious thought should be devoted to determining
which functions are inherently governmental (and which—presumably com-
mercial activities—are not). Arguably, that’s what the FAIR Act was supposed
to do.133 That regime should not be ignored. The Government should then
vehicles, T&M contracts should be preferred to using cost-reimbursement contracts when firm-
fixed-price contracts are not practicable”); Ralph C. Nash & John Cibinic, “Cost-Based” Contract-
ing: On the Way Out? 12 Nash & Cibinic Rep. ¶ 58 (Nov. 1998) (discussion of “alternatives to
cost reimbursement contracting”); Ralph C. Nash & John Cibinic, Time and Materials and Labor-
Hour Contracts: Fixed-Price or Cost Contracts? 12 Nash & Cibinic Rep. ¶ 1 ( Jan. 1998) (including
research provided by Steve Feldman).
133. Federal Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105–270, 112 Stat.
2382. See also 2003 FAIR Act Inventory User’s Guide, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/
procurement/fair/2003users_guide.html, which explains:
The FAIR Act directs . . . agencies to issue . . . an inventory of all commercial activities
performed by federal employees. . . . Upon the completion of [OMB] review and consultation,
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systematically prioritize activities on the FAIR Act inventory depending upon
how robust the marketplace is for similar services.134 (In other words, begin
by outsourcing those services most readily available in the private sector.)
Once a function shifts to the private sector, market forces take over. Before
plowing through the FAIR Act inventory, however, the Government must
devote sufficient resources to ensure that the contracts that replace the gov-
ernment personnel are driven by meaningful metrics; select appropriate con-
tractors; ensure appropriate oversight into the performance of the contracts;
collect sufficient information to determine whether the metrics are being
achieved; and adjust the contracting vehicles accordingly.
A rational transition means identifying the right jobs to compete, then
incentivizing successful contractors to outperform the people they replaced.
Poorly planned and executed contracts won’t lead to quality improvements,
and they waste taxpayers’ money.
There’s no such thing as a free lunch. Changing the nature of Government
can’t be done on the cheap. Eliminating government employees makes for
great political rhetoric. But whether you call it competitive sourcing, con-
tracting out, outsourcing, or downsizing, without proper planning, it won’t
be efficient, and it won’t enable the Government to serve the public well.
The outsourcing train has left the station. Until it returns, the future of
Government depends upon a massive cadre of Contracting Officers, contract
the agency is required to transmit . . . the . . . Inventory . . . to the Congress and . . . the public.
The FAIR Act then establishes a limited administrative challenge and appeals process
under which an interested party may challenge the omission or the inclusion of a particular
activity. . . .
134. This is not necessarily what the Defense Department seeks to achieve through its core
competency approach. As GAO explained:
In providing guidance for determining whether activities or functions . . . are considered to be
inherently governmental in nature, DOD has sometimes equated the term “inherently gov-
ernmental” with the somewhat parallel term “core.” . . . DOD has sometimes used the term
to designate military and civilian essential positions required for military and national security
reasons.
. . .
[I]n April 2002, [DOD] launched a departmentwide effort to distinguish . . . functions with an
emphasis on retaining in-house only those functions deemed core to the warfighting
mission. . . .”
General Accounting Office, Defense Management: DOD Faces Challenges Implementing
Its Core Competency Approach and A-76 Competitions, Report to the Ranking Minority
Member, Subcommittee on Military Readiness, Committee on Armed Services, House of
Representatives, GAO-03–818, at 7–8 (2003), at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d03818.pdf (also describing the Army’s “Third Wave,” which, “unlike the earlier two waves, . . .
focused on A-76 studies of about 25,000 and 33,000 positions, . . . potentially involv[ed] over
200,000 positions”). Among other things, GAO reported that the Army “found that distinguish-
ing between core and non-core functions, by itself, has limited value because that distinction
alone does not necessarily prescribe a sourcing decision.” Id. at 9. For an extensive discussion of
DoD’s approach before the Third Wave, see, e.g., Mary E. Harney, The Quiet Revolution: Down-
sizing, Outsourcing, and Best Value, 158 Mil. L. Rev. 48, 52 (1998) (“As government officials looked
inward to discover where and how to change, they called for a more streamlined, efficient gov-
ernment. Within the DOD, leaders seized upon downsizing and outsourcing to achieve these
goals.”).
Competitive Sourcing Policy: More Sail Than Rudder? 297
specialists, contract managers, auditors, and quality assurance personnel.
Despite their best intentions, they are not up to the present task. Nor can
they meet the challenges ahead. Congress must replenish and upgrade the
acquisition community to address the Government’s burgeoning reliance on
service contractors. Failing to do so is malfeasance. That’s no way to run a
Government.
